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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 243 |
| ISSN | 1664-7041 |
| Number of Pages | 8 |
| Date | 2017 |
| Abstract Text | It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a contest technology with higher accuracy. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp243.pdf |
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| Keywords | Tullock contest, Nash equilibrium, heterogeneous valuations, discrimination, Lotterie, Bewertung, Nash-Gleichgewicht, Diskriminanzanalyse |