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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
Organization Unit
  • Christian Ewerhart
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number 243
ISSN 1664-7041
Number of Pages 8
Date 2017
Abstract Text It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a contest technology with higher accuracy.
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Keywords Tullock contest, Nash equilibrium, heterogeneous valuations, discrimination, Lotterie, Bewertung, Nash-Gleichgewicht, Diskriminanzanalyse