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Contribution Details

Type Conference or Workshop Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Published in Proceedings Yes
Title Core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions with uncertain availability of goods
Organization Unit
  • Dmitry Moor
  • Sven Seuken
  • Tobias Grubenmann
  • Abraham Bernstein
Presentation Type paper
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
  • English
ISBN 978-1-57735-770-4
Page Range 424 - 430
Event Title Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Event Type conference
Event Location New York, USA
Event Start Date July 9 - 2016
Event End Date July 15 - 2016
Number 67
Place of Publication New York, USA
Publisher AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Abstract Text In some auction domains, there is uncertainty regarding the final availability of the goods being auctioned off. For example, a government may auction off spectrum from its public safety network, but it may need this spectrum back in times of emergency. In such a domain, standard combinatorial auctions perform poorly because they lead to violations of individual rationality (IR), even in expectation, and to very low efficiency. In this paper, we study the design of core-selecting payment rules for such domains. Surprisingly, we show that in this new domain, there does not exist a payment rule with is guaranteed to be ex-post core-selecting. However, we show that by designing rules that are “execution-contingent,” i.e., by charging payments that are conditioned on the realization of the availability of the goods, we can reduce IR violations. We design two core-selecting rules that always satisfy IR in expectation. To study the performance of our rules we perform a computational Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis. We show that, in equilibrium, our new rules have better incentives, higher efficiency, and a lower rate of ex-post IR violations than standard core-selecting rules.
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