Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Persistent bias in advice-giving |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Language |
|
| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 228 |
| ISSN | 1664-7041 |
| Number of Pages | 47 |
| Date | 2017 |
| Abstract Text | We show that a one-off incentive to bias advice has persistent effects. In an experiment, advisers were paid a bonus to recommend a lottery which only risk-seeking individuals should choose to a less informed client. Afterwards, they had to choose for themselves and make a second recommendation to another client, without any bonus. These advisers choose the risky lottery and recommend it a second time up to six times more often than advisers in a control group who were never offered a bonus. These results are consistent with a theory we present which is based on advisers' image concerns of appearing incorruptible. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp228.pdf |
| Related URLs | |
| PDF File |
Download from ZORA
|
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|
| Keywords | Advice-giving, conflict of interest, self-signaling, self-deception, Persönlicher Rat, Risikobereitschaft, Selbsttäuschung, Interessenkonflikt, Experiment |
| Additional Information | Revised version |