Not logged in.

Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of non-linear utilities
Organization Unit
  • Alexey Kushnir
  • Liu Shuo
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number 212
ISSN 1664-7041
Number of Pages 22
Date 2015
Abstract Text We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the average single-crossing property and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision.
Official URL
Related URLs
PDF File Download from ZORA
Export BibTeX
Keywords Bayesian implementation, dominant strategy implementation, mechanism design, non-linear utilities, single-crossing, Nutzenfunktion, Nichtlineare Funktionalanalysis, Bayes-Verfahren, Stochastische Dominanz, Mechanismus-Design-Theorie, Agency-Theorie