Contributions in Merlin

There has been a recent interest in reporting p-values adjusted for resampling-based stepdown multiple testing procedures proposed in Romano and Wolf (2005a,b). The original papers only describe how to carry out multiple testing at a fixed significance level. Computing adjusted p-values instead in an efficient manner is not entirely trivial. Therefore, this paper fills an apparent gap by detailing such an algorithm.

Many literatures investigate the causal impact of income on economic outcomes, for example in the context of intergenerational transmission or well-being and health. Some studies have proposed to use employer wage differentials and in particular industry affiliation as an instrument for income. We demonstrate that industry affiliation is correlated with fixed individual characteristics, specifically parents' education and own height, conditional on the covariates typically controlled for in these studies. These results suggest that there is selection into industries based on unobservables. As a result the exclusion restriction in many IV studies of this type is likely violated.

This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor will step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. We study experimentally whether people employ the argument "if I don’t do it, someone else will" to justify taking a narrowly self-interested action. Our data reveal a clear pattern. Subjects do not employ the "replacement excuse" if a social norm exists that classifies the selfish action as immoral. But if no social norm exists, subjects are more inclined to take a selfish action in situations where another subject can otherwise take it. By demonstrating the importance of social norms of moral behavior for limiting the power of the replacement excuse, our paper informs the long-standing debate on the effect of markets on morals.

Do wealth shocks affect the health of the elderly in developed countries? The economic literature is skeptical about such effects which have so far only been found for poor retirees in poor countries. In this paper I show that wealth shocks also matter for the health of wealthy retirees in the US. I exploit the booms and busts in the US stock market as a natural experiment that generated considerable gains and losses in the wealth of stock-holding retirees.Using data from the Health and Retirement Study I construct wealth shocks as the interaction of stock holdings with stock market changes. These constructed wealth shocks are highly predictive of changes in reported wealth. And they strongly affect health outcomes. A 10% wealth shock leads to an improvement of 2-3% of a standard deviation in physical health, mental health and survival rates. Effects are heterogeneous across physical health conditions, with most pronounced effects for the incidence of high blood pressure, smaller effects for heart problems and no effects for arthritis, diabetes, lung diseases and cancer. The comparison with the cross-sectional relationship of wealth and health suggests that the estimated effects of wealth shocks are larger than the long-run wealth elasticity of health.

Das Interesse an der Verteilung von Einkommen und Vermögen ist in jüngster Zeit wieder neu entbrannt. Nicht zuletzt, weil nach vielen Jahren der Stabilität die Ungleichheit in vielen Ländern wieder zunimmt. Auch in der Schweiz geniesst die Frage nach der Einkommens- und Vermögensverteilung in der öffentlichen und politischen Diskussion grosse Aufmerksamkeit. Die Analyse über die letzten 100 Jahre zeigt, dass im Ländervergleich das Niveau der Einkommen und Löhne in der Schweiz hoch ist, die Ungleichheit zwischen Arm und Reich wenig stark ausgeprägt ist und sich die Öffnung der Einkommensschere über die Zeit in engen Grenzen hält. Die Ausnahme bilden die Superreichen, deren Anteile in jüngster Zeit deutlich zugenommen haben. Die relativ egalitäre Primärverteilung der Einkommen und Löhne und die föderale Struktur mit ihrem Steuerwettbewerb führen dazu, dass Bedarf und Ausmass der Umverteilung relativ gering ausfallen. Als Kehrseite der Medaille ist die hohe Stabilität wohl ein Grund dafür, dass die Einkommensmobilität im internationalen Vergleich gering ausfällt. Dafür fällt das Durchschnittsniveau der Einkommen rekordhoch aus. Die gefundenen Aussagen gelten verstärkt für die Vermögen. Diese reagieren viel träger auf Einzelereignisse, weil sie über Jahrzehnte aufgebaut werden. Die anhaltende politische Stabilität und die berechenbare Wirtschaftspolitik haben der Schweiz neben sehr hohen Durchschnittsvermögen eine sehr persistente Vermögensverteilung beschert, womit sie unter Industrieländern eine grosse Ausnahme darstellt. Entsprechend ist die Vermögenskonzentration im internationalen Vergleich sehr hoch. Das Ausmass relativiert sich aber, wenn wir die für die Schweiz wichtigen Pensionskassenvermögen miteinbeziehen.

Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable body of experimental evidence suggests that informal peer sanctions cause large collateral damage and efficiency costs. This raises the question whether peer sanctioning systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce two relevant features of social life into the experiment: (i) subjects can migrate across groups with different sanctioning institutions and (ii) they have the chance to achieve consensus about normatively appropriate behavior. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized sanctioning by an elected judge the dominant institution. However, if given the choice, subjects universally reject peer sanctioning without a norm consensus opportunity – an institution that has hitherto dominated research in this field – in favor of peer sanctioning with a norm consensus opportunity or an equally efficient institution with centralized punishment by an elected judge. Migration opportunities and normative consensus building are key to the quick emergence of an efficient culture of universal cooperation because the more prosocial subjects populate the two efficient institutions first, elect prosocial judges (if institutionally possible), and immediately establish a social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects’ cooperation and punishment choices, including the virtually complete removal of antisocial punishment when judges make the sanctioning decision.

We analyze the endogenous formation of R&D networks, where firms are active in different product markets and can benefit from R&D spillovers form collaborating firms within or across different industries. R&D spillovers help firms to introduce process innovations to lower their production costs. Product innovations introduce an escape-competition effect, through which firms can enter new markets with fewer competitors. We provide a complete equilibrium char- acterization in which both, the network of R&D collaborations as well as the market structure, are endogenously determined. We show that the coevolution of market and network structure matter for the relationship between competition and innovation. Moreover, our model allows us to explain differences in the R&D network structures observed across different industries, and how they are related to different levels of competition in these industries.

This paper investigates how the peer gender composition in university affects students' major choices and labor market outcomes. Women who are randomly assigned to more female peers become less likely to choose male-dominated majors, they end up in jobs where they work fewer hours and their wage grows at a slower rate. Men become more likely to choose male-dominated majors after having had more female peers, although their labor market outcomes are not affected. Our results suggest that the increasing female university enrolment over recent decades has paradoxically contributed to the occupational segregation among university graduates that persists in today’s labor market.

In many societies, the power to punish is granted to a centralized authority. While the punishment of free-riders has been shown to play an important role in the provision of public goods, corruption might strongly disrupt the ability of a centralized authority to foster cooperation. In this paper, we show that cooperation is reduced by 30% if the punishment authority can be bribed. Two concurrent channels lead to this result. First, low contributors use bribery as a way to tame the punishment authority. The punishment authority tends to reciprocate these bribes by assigning fewer punishment points. These low levels of punishment do not suffice to discipline the free-riders, who never raise their contributions. Second, bribery has negative spillovers on high contributors, who get discouraged and gradually decrease their contributions down to the level of low contributors. Overall, our paper highlights a potential peril of centralization: the sensitivity of the punishment authority to bribery.

We investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration of regional sports networks (RSNs) with programming distributors in U.S. multichannel television markets. Vertical integration can enhance efficiency by reducing double marginalization and increasing carriage of channels, but can also harm welfare due to foreclosure and incentives to raise rivals' costs. We estimate a structural model of viewership, subscription, distributor pricing, and affiliate fee bargaining using a rich dataset on the U.S. cable and satellite television industry (2000-2010). We use these estimates to analyze the impact of simulated vertical mergers and divestitures of RSNs on competition and welfare, and examine the efficacy of regulatory policies introduced by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to address competition concerns in this industry.