Contributions in Merlin

Applying stochastic frontier analysis, we estimate the importance of sports in society as technical efficiency of countries in the production ofnOlympic success since the 1950s. Our measures of success are medal shares and a broader concept including Olympic diplomas. Following Bernard andnBusse (2004), population and GDP are used as inputs. While the impact of GDP is always positive, we show that the sign of the population effect depends on wealth and population size of a country.nThe results show that the spread of importance is very wide over time, across countries, gender, and sports. These differences can be seen asncaused by differences in financial support, training methods, organization, or culture. Using the method proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), we confirm the result well documented in the literature that planned economies and host countries are more successful than others in terms of Olympic successn(e.g. Bernard and Busse, 2004). The method allows to shed light on important aspects of recent sport history, such as the consequences of thenbreakdown of the former Soviet Union.

The impact of aging on healthcare expenditure (HCE) has been at the center of a prolonged debate. This paper purports to shed light on several issues. First, it presents new evidence on the relative importance of the two components of HCE that have been distinguished by Zweifel, Felder and Meier (1999), viz. the cost of morbidity and the cost of mortality (their "red herring" hypothesis claims that neglecting the mortality component results in excessive estimates of future growth of HCE). Second, it takes account of recent evidence suggesting that HCE does increase life expectancy, implying that time-to-death is an endogenous determinant of HCE. Third, it investigates the contribution of population aging to the future growth of HCE. For the case of Switzerland, it finds this contribution to be relatively small regardless of whether or not the cost of dying is accounted for, thus qualifying the "red herring" hypothesis.

Relying on a simple endogenous growth model, this paper highlights a political instability effect as a potential explanation for why foreign aid is frequently ineffective with respect to economic performance. In the present framework, the role of the state is to fund institutions allowing for ongoing technology adoption and hence long-run growth.nHowever, providing a self-interested government with additional resources to fill a possible ”financing gap” may not result in better institutions. More money in the hands of the regime fuels conflict over the distribution of the funds - and decreases the incumbent regime’s time horizon in office. With a shorter time horizon, it is less attractive to financengood institutions whose returns mainly accrue in the future. Panel data evidence pointsnindeed to a sizable causal effect of foreign aid on political instability in the 1980s and 1990s.

Research evaluation is praised as the symbol of modern quality management. We claim firstly, performance evaluations in research have higher costs than normally assumed, because the evaluated persons and institutions systematically change their behavior andndevelop counter strategies. Moreover, intrinsic work motivation is crowded out and undesired lock-in effects take place. Secondly, the benefits of performance evaluations are questionable.nEvaluations provide too little information relevant for decision-making. In addition, they losenimportance due to new forms of scientific cooperation on the internet. Thirdly, there existnsuperior alternatives. They consist in careful selection and supportive process coaching – and then leave individuals and research institutions to direct themselves.

It is typically assumed that people engage in entrepreneurship because there are profits to be made. In contrast to this view, this paper argues that entrepreneurship is more adequately characterized as a non-profit-seeking activity. Evidence from a broad range of authors and academic fields is discussed showing that entrepreneurship does quite generally not pay in monetary terms. Being an entrepreneur seems to be rather rewarding because it entails substantialnnon-monetary benefits, like greater autonomy, broader skill utilization, and the possibility to pursue one’s own ideas. It is shown how incorporating these non-monetary benefits intoneconomic models of entrepreneurship can lead to a better understanding of the phenomenon.

The idea that there is a uniformly “optimal” governance structure for corporationsnfeatures prominently in current debates and policy proposals. In this paper, we propose andifferent, constitutional theory of corporate governance: the criterion for a good corporatengovernance structure is whether it is freely chosen by the shareholders. We illustrate ournapproach by comparing the constitutional rights of shareholders under US corporate law and Swiss corporate law. Moreover, we discuss the mandatory provisions that shareholders would likely include in corporate law at a constitutional stage, behind the veil of ignorance.

Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcomingnfree-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in socialndilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come intonexistence. In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, thenendogenous formation of institutions in a public goods game. Our theoretical analysisnshows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, includingnthose where institutions govern only a subset of players. The experiment confirmsnthat institutions are formed frequently as well as that institution formation has anpositive impact on cooperation rates and group welfare. However, the data clearlynreveal that players are unwilling to implement institutions in which some playersnhave the opportunity to free ride. In sum, our results show that individuals arenwilling and able to create sanctioning institutions, but that the institution formationnprocess is guided by behavioral principles not taken into account by standard theory.

The aim of this paper is to study whether schooling choices are affected by social interactions. Such social interactions may be important because children enjoy spending time with other children or parents learn from other parents about the ability of their children. Identificationnis based on a randomized intervention that grants a cash subsidy encouraging schoolnattendance among a sub-group of eligible children within small rural villages in Mexico. Results indicate that (i) the eligible children tend to attend school more frequently, (ii) but also the ineligible children acquire more schooling when the subsidy is introduced in their local village, (iii) social interactions are economically important, and (iv) they may arise due to changes innparents’ perception of their children’s ability.

This paper studies a program that extends the maximum duration of unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to 209 weeks. Interestingly, this program is targeted to individuals aged 50nyears or older, living in certain eligible regions in Austria. In the evaluation, I use sharp discontinuities in treatment assignment at age 50 and at the border between eligible regions and control regions to identify the effect of extended benefits on unemployment duration. Resultsnindicate that the duration of job search is prolonged by at least .09 weeks per additional week of benefits among men, whereas unemployment duration increases by at least .32 weeks per additional week of benefits among women. The salient differences between men and women are consistent with the lower minimum age for early retirement applying to women.

This paper studies the theoretical properties of a channel system of interestratencontrol in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Agents are subject to liquidity shocks which can be partially insured in a secured money market, ornat a standing facility operated by the central bank. We show that it is optimal to have a strictly positive interest rate corridor and that a shift of the corridor affects the money market rate one for one. Moreover, the central bank canntighten its policy without changing its policy rate by simply increasing the corridor symmetrically around the policy rate.