Contributions in Merlin

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In many games of imperfect information, players can make Bayesian inferences about other players’ types based on the information that is contained in their own type. Several behavioral theories of belief-updating even start from the assumption that players project their own type onto others also when it is not rational. We investigate such inferences in a simple environment that is a vital ingredient of numerous game-theoretic models and experiments, in which types are drawn from one out of two states of the world and participants have to guess the type of another participant. We find little evidence for irrational over-projection. Instead, between 50% and 70% of the participants in our experiment completely neglect the information contained in their own type and base their beliefs and choices only on the prior probabilities. Using several experimental interventions, we show that this striking neglect of information is very robust.

We study binary opinion formation in a large population where individuals are influenced by the opinions of other individuals. The population is characterised by the existence of (i) communities where individuals share some similar features, (ii) opinion leaders that may trigger unpredictable opinion shifts in the short term (iii) some degree of incomplete information in the observation of the individual or public opinion processes. In this setting, we study three different approximate mechanisms: common sampling approximation, independent sampling approximation, and, what will be our main focus in this paper, McKean-Vlasov (or mean-field) approximation. We show that all three approximations perform well in terms of different metrics that we introduce for measuring population level and individual level errors. In the presence of a common noise represented by the major influencers opinions processes, and despite the absence of idiosyncratic noises, we derive a propagation of chaos type result. For the particular case of a linear model and particular specifications of the major influencers opinion dynamics, we provide additional analysis, including long term behavior and fluctuations of the public opinion. The theoretical results are complemented by some concrete examples and numerical analysis, illustrating the formation of echo-chambers, the propagation of chaos, and phenomena such as snowball effect and social inertia.

Mergers and acquisitions are often motivated by the intention of creating value from intangible assets. We develop a novel word list of intangibles and apply it to takeover announcements. The value of these deals to the acquirer, as shown by abnormal announcement returns, is questionable: One standard deviation more in intangibles talk lowers returns by 0.50 percentage points. Agency problems explain little of these results. Rather, the cross-section of announcement returns, payment mode choices, and insider trades suggest that intangibles talk reflects managerial overoptimism. In sum, takeover announcements reveal important information regarding the quality of deals.

Although real integration conceptually plays an important role for the comovement of international equity markets, documenting this link empirically has proven challenging. We construct a new dataset of theory-guided, relevant measures of bilateral trade in final and intermediate goods and services. With these measures, we provide evidence of a strong link between changes in international trade – in particular global value chains – and equity market comovement.These results suggest that supply chain disruptions and reshoring, for instance due to political tensions, war, and the COVID-19 crisis, might affect the interconnections between stock markets via rippling through the global production network.

We investigate the impact of three non-climate environmental criteria: biodiversity, water, and pollution prevention, on infrastructure firms' credit risk term structure from the perspective of double materiality. Our findings show that firms that effectively manage these three environmental risks to which they are materially exposed have up to 93bps better long-term refinancing conditions compared to the worst-performing firms. While the results are less significant for the firm's material impact on the environment, investors still reward the management of these criteria beyond climate with improved long-term financing conditions for infrastructure investments. Overall, we find that financial markets respond positively to the prospect of more stringent regulations related to these criteria, which are currently used by the EU Taxonomy to assess the sustainability of investments.

We examine the roles of bank ownership and CEO political faction membership in facilitating or hindering the implementation of central bank policy in China. Specifically, we examine the response of China's commercial banks to People's Bank of China (PBC) guidelines intended to decrease mortgage lending and to slow down the rise in residential property prices. We find that both bank ownership and faction membership matter. Central government-owned banks whose CEOs are members of the specialist finance faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) respond most strongly to PBC guidance, whereas provincial or city government-owned banks whose CEOs are members of a generalist faction respond least strongly. The implementation of PBC policy has real effects: in those cities where central government-owned banks with specialist CEOs constitute a larger percentage of total bank branches, house prices grew more slowly, as did the number of residential real estate transactions and the number of new listings. Where in contrast provincial and city government-owned banks with generalist CEOs dominate, the number of transactions grew faster; the rate of house price appreciation and the number of listings were however unaffected. We conclude that China's different levels of government and the CCP's different factions enjoy some discretion in responding to PBC guidance and that they exploit the discretion they are afforded to vary the strength of their response.

I find that corporate European leverage variation between 2007 and 2015 is largely driven by firm and industry characteristics. Conventional, time-varying firm characteristics explain as much leverage variation as country and industry fixed effects combined. Cross-sectional leverage disparities are more distinct between industries than between countries. Corporate tax rate does have a significant positive effect on leverage, as predicted by the traditional tradeoff theory. The impact is however negligibly small relative to firm- and industry-specific effects. Evidence on both the tradeoff and pecking order model is, at best, mixed. Moreover, macroeconomic conditions are largely insignificant and unable to explain leverage differences in a linear regression context. Macroeconomic effects on capital structure might however channel through firm and industry determinants, thus affecting financing choice indirectly. A more dynamic, possibly nonlinear model specification is needed. Effects of the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent European debt crisis are apparent across all of corporate Europe and are most severe for Southern European firms.

This study examines the alpha-generating power of the public-report-based ESG score, which is based on ESG incident data collected by RepRisk from various public sources, and its relationship with the self-disclosure-based ESG score obtained from Refinitiv. We construct pure ESG factor portfolios to neutralize exposure to common style factors and isolate the pure ESG factor returns. Our results suggest that (i) the source difference is the main cause of the negative correlation between the public report ESG and the self-disclosure ESG score, (ii) the public report ESG score and its subscores produce the mixed results in terms of their adjusted factor returns across regions, (iii) the combination of the public report ESG and the self-disclosure ESG score significantly improves the risk-return profiles of the combined ESG factor returns in the US, EU and Japan.

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