Contributions published at Banking (Stefano Battiston)

The structure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market competition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control held by each global player. We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie structure and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions. This core can be seen as an economic “super-entity” that raises new important issues both for researchers and policy makers.

We introduce a new model for the evolution of networks of firms exchanging knowledge in R&D partnerships. Innovation is assumed to result from the recombination of knowledge among firms in an R&D intensive industry. The decision of two firms to establish a new partnerships or to terminate an existing one, is based on their marginal revenues and costs, which in turn depend on the position they occupy in the network. Moreover, the formation of a collaboration has significant external effects on the other firms in the same connected component of the network. We show that this decentralized partner selection process leads to the existence of multiple equilibrium structures. Finally, by means of computer simulations, we study the properties of the emerging equilibrium networks and we show that they reproduce the stylized facts of R&D networks.

In this paper, we investigate the network of ownership relationships among European firms and its embedding in the geographical space. We carry out a detailed analysis of geographical distances between pairs of nodes, connected by edges or by shortest paths of varying length. In particular, we study the relation between geographical distance and network distance in comparison with a random spatial network model. While the distribution of geographical distance can be fairly well reproduced, important deviations appear in the network distance and in the size of the largest strongly connected component. Our results show that geographical factors allow us to capture several features of the network, while the deviations quantify the effect of additional economic factors at work in shaping the topology. The analysis is relevant to other types of geographically embedded networks and sheds light on the link formation process in the presence of spatial constraints.

We have discovered 12 independent new empirical scaling laws in foreign exchange data series that hold for close to three orders of magnitude and across 13 currency exchange rates. Our statistical analysis crucially depends on an event-based approach that measures the relationship between different types of events. The scaling laws give an accurate estimation of the length of the price-curve coastline, which turns out to be surprisingly long. The new laws substantially extend the catalogue of stylized facts and sharply constrain the space of possible theoretical explanations of the market mechanisms.

We present here an overview of the use of networks in Finance and Economics. We show how this approach enables us to address important questions as, for example, the structure of control chains in financial systems, the systemic risk associated with them and the evolution of trade between nations. All these results are new in the field and allow for a better understanding and modelling of different economic systems.

We propose a novel trust metric for social networks which is suitable for application to recommender systems. It is personalised and dynamic, and allows to compute the indirect trust between two agents which are not neighbours based on the direct trust between agents that are neighbours. In analogy to some personalised versions of PageRank, this metric makes use of the concept of feedback centrality and overcomes some of the limitations of other trust metrics. In particular, it does not neglect cycles and other patterns characterising social networks, as some other algorithms do. In order to apply the metric to recommender systems, we propose a way to make trust dynamic over time. We show by means of analytical approximations and computer simulations that the metric has the desired properties. Finally, we carry out an empirical validation on a dataset crawled from an Internet community and compare the performance of a recommender system using our metric to one using collaborative filtering.

We introduce a general framework for models of cascade and contagion processes on networks, to identify their commonalities and differences. In particular, models of social and financial cascades, as well as the fiber bundle model, the voter model, and models of epidemic spreading are recovered as special cases. To unify their description, we define the net fragility of a node, which is the difference between its fragility and the threshold that determines its failure. Nodes fail if their net fragility grows above zero and their failure increases the fragility of neighbouring nodes, thus possibly triggering a cascade. In this framework, we identify three classes depending on the way the fragility of a node is increased by the failure of a neighbour. At the microscopic level, we illustrate with specific examples how the failure spreading pattern varies with the node triggering the cascade, depending on its position in the network and its degree. At the macroscopic level, systemic risk is measured as the final fraction of failed nodes, X*, and for each of the three classes we derive a recursive equation to compute its value. The phase diagram of X* as a function of the initial conditions, thus allows for a prediction of the systemic risk as well as a comparison of the three different model classes. We could identify which model class leads to a first-order phase transition in systemic risk, i.e. situations where small changes in the initial conditions determine a global failure. Eventually, we generalize our framework to encompass stochastic contagion models. This indicates the potential for further generalizations.

We present a methodology to extract the backbone of complex networks based on the weight and direction of links, as well as on nontopological properties of nodes. We show how the methodology can be applied in general to networks in which mass or energy is flowing along the links. In particular, the procedure enables us to address important questions in economics, namely, how control and wealth are structured and concentrated across national markets. We report on the first cross-country investigation of ownership networks, focusing on the stock markets of 48 countries around the world. On the one hand, our analysis confirms results expected on the basis of the literature on corporate control, namely, that in Anglo-Saxon countries control tends to be dispersed among numerous shareholders. On the other hand, it also reveals that in the same countries, control is found to be highly concentrated at the global level, namely, lying in the hands of very few important shareholders. Interestingly, the exact opposite is observed for European countries. These results have previously not been reported as they are not observable without the kind of network analysis developed here.

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Networks play an important role in a wide range of economic phenomena. Despite this fact, standard economic theory rarely considers economic networks explicitly in its analysis. However, a major innovation in economic theory has been the use of methods stemming from graph theory to describe and study relations between economic agents in networks. This recent development has lead to a fast increase in theoretical research on economic networks. In this tutorial, we introduce the reader to some basic concepts used in a wide range of models of economic networks.

We study the mean field approximation of a recent model of cascades on networks relevant to the investigation of systemic risk control in financial networks. In the model, the hypothesis of a trend reinforcement in the stochastic process describing the fragility of the nodes, induces a trade-off in the systemic risk with respect to the density of the network. Increasing the average link density, the network is first less exposed to systemic risk, while above an intermediate value the systemic risk increases. This result offers a simple explanation for the emergence of instabilities in financial systems that get increasingly interwoven. In this paper, we study the dynamics of the probability density function of the average fragility. This converges to a unique stable distribution which can be computed numerically and can be used to estimate the systemic risk as a function of the parameters of the model.

In this paper, we present a model of a trust-based recommendation system on a social network. The idea of the model is that agents use their social network to reach information and their trust relationships to filter it. We investigate how the dynamics of trust among agents affect the performance of the system by comparing it to a frequency-based recommendation system. Furthermore, we identify the impact of network density, preference heterogeneity among agents, and knowledge sparseness to be crucial factors for the performance of the system. The system self-organises in a state with performance near to the optimum; the performance on the global level is an emergent property of the system, achieved without explicit coordination from the local interactions of agents.

We investigate some of the properties and extensions of a dynamic innovation network model recently introduced in. In the model, the set of efficient graphs ranges, depending on the cost for maintaining a link, from the complete graph to the (quasi-) star, varying within a well defined class of graphs. However, the interplay between dynamics on the nodes and topology of the network leads to equilibrium networks which are typically not efficient and are characterized, as observed in empirical studies of R&D networks, by sparseness, presence of clusters and heterogeneity of degree. In this paper, we analyze the relation between the growth rate of the knowledge stock of the agents from R&D collaborations and the properties of the adjacency matrix associated with the network of collaborations. By means of computer simulations we further investigate how the equilibrium network is affected by increasing the evaluation time τ over which agents evaluate whether to maintain a link or not. We show that only if τ is long enough, efficient networks can be obtained by the selfish link formation process of agents, otherwise the equilibrium network is inefficient. This work should assist in building a theoretical framework of R&D networks from which policies can be derived that aim at fostering efficient innovation networks.

Although standard economics textbooks are seldom interested in production networks, modern economies are more and more based upon supplier/customer interactions. One can consider entire sectors of the economy as generalised supply chains. We will take this view in the present paper and study under which conditions local failures to produce or simply to deliver can result in avalanches of shortage and bankruptcies and in localisation of the economic activity. We will show that a large class of models exhibit scale free distributions of production and wealth among firms and that regions of high production are localised.

We present a simple model of a production network in which firms are linked by supplier–customer relationships involving extension of trade–credit. Our aim is to identify the minimal set of mechanisms which reproduce qualitatively the main stylized facts of industrial demography, such as firms’ size distribution, and, at the same time, the correlation, over time and across firms, of output, growth and bankruptcies. The behavior of aggregate variables can be traced back to the direct firm–firm interdependence. In this paper, we assume that the number of firms is constant and the network has a periodic static structure. But the framework allows further extensions to investigate which network structures are more robust against domino effects and, if the network is let to evolve in time, which structures emerge spontaneously, depending on the individual strategies for orders and delivery.

We propose a network description of large market investments, where both stocks and shareholders are represented as vertices connected by weighted links corresponding to shareholdings. In this framework, the in-degree ($k_{in}$) and the sum of incoming link weights (v) of an investor correspond to the number of assets held (portfolio diversification) and to the invested wealth (portfolio volume), respectively. An empirical analysis of three different real markets reveals that the distributions of both $k_{in}$ and v display power-law tails with exponents y and a. Moreover, we find that $k_{in}$ scales as a power-law function of v with an exponent b. Remarkably, despite the values of a, b and y differ across the three markets, they are always governed by the scaling relation b = (1-a)/(1-y). We show that these empirical findings can be reproduced by a recent model relating the emergence of scale-free networks to an underlying Paretian distribution of ‘hidden’ vertex properties.

We study the topological structure of the network of shareholding relationships in the Italian stock market (MIB) and in two US stock markets (NYSE and NASDAQ). The portfolio diversification and the wealth invested on the market by economical agents have been shown in our previous work to have all a power law behavior. However, a further investigation shows that the inner structure of the capital control network are not at all the same across markets. The shareholding network is a weighted graph, therefore we introduce two quantities analogous to in-degree and out-degree for weighted graphs which measure, respectively: the number of effective shareholders of a stock and the number of companies effectively controlled by a single holder. Combining the information carried by the distributions of these two quantities we are able to extract the backbone of each market and we find that while the MIB splits into several separated groups of interest, the US markets is characterized by very large holders sharing control on overlapping subsets of stocks. This method seems promising for the analysis of the topology of capital control networks in general and not only in the stock market.

The boards of directors of the largest corporations of a country together with the directors form a dense bipartite network. The board network consists of boards connected through common directors. The director network is obtained taking the directors as nodes, and a membership in the same board as a link. These networks are involved in the decision making processes relevant to the macro-economy of a country. We present an extensive and comparative analysis of the statistical properties of the board network and the director network for the first 1000 US corporations ranked by revenue (“Fortune 1000”) in the year 1999 and for the corporations of the Italian Stock Market. We find several common statistical properties across the data sets, despite the fact that they refer to different years and countries. This suggests an underlying universal formation mechanism which is not captured in a satisfactory way by the existent network models. In particular we find that all the considered networks are Small Worlds, assortative, highly clustered and dominated by a giant component. Several other properties are examined. The presence of a lobby in a board, a feature relevant to decision making dynamics, turns out to be a macroscopic phenomenon in all the data sets.

Members of boards of directors of large corporations who also serve together on an outside board, form the so-called interlock graph of the board and are assumed to have a strong influence on each others’ opinion. We here study how the size and the topology of the interlock graph affect the probability that the board approves a strategy proposed by the Chief Executive Officer. We propose a measure of the impact of the interlock on the decision making, which is found to be a good predictor of the decision dynamics outcome. We present two models of decision making dynamics, and we apply them to the data of the boards of the largest US corporations in 1999.