Jean-Charles Rochet, Modelling Credit Cycles, In: IGIER 20th Anniversary Conference Universita' Bocconi. 2011. (Conference Presentation)
PLAN OF THE PRESENTATION
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I will analyze three theoretical mechanisms that could generate credit fluctuations:
1. Collateral constraints
2. Credit reversals
3. Pecuniary externalities
4. Wrap-up and policy implications
5. Conclusion
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Jean-Charles Rochet, Gibt es einen "dritten Weg" in die Zukunft des Banking, In: NZZ, 15, p. 35, 19 January 2011. (Newspaper Article)
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Jean-Charles Rochet, Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Paul Décamps, Stéphane Villeneuve, Free cash flow, issuance costs, and stock prices, Journal of Finance, Vol. 66 (5), 2011. (Journal Article)
We develop a dynamic model of a firm facing agency costs of free cash flow and externalfinancing costs, and derive an explicit solution for the firm’s optimal balance sheet dynamics. Financial frictions affect issuance and dividend policies, the value of cash holdings, and the dynamics of stock prices. The model predicts that the marginal value of cash varies negatively with the stock price, and positively with the volatility of the stock price. This yields novel insights on the asymmetric volatility phenomenon, on risk management policies, and on how business cycles and agency costs affect the volatility of stock returns. |
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Jean-Charles Rochet, Stéphane Villeneuve, Liquidity management and corporate demand for hedging and insurance, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 20 (3), 2011. (Journal Article)
We analyze the demand for hedging and insurance by a firm facingcash-flow risks. We study how the firm’s liquidity managementpolicy interacts with two types of risk: a Brownian risk that canbe hedged through a financial derivative, and a Poisson risk thatcan be insured by an insurance contract. We find that the patternsof insurance and hedging decisions are pole apart: cash-poor firmsshould hedge but not insure, whereas the opposite is true for cashrichfirms. We also find non-monotonic effects of profitability. Thismay explain the mixed findings of empirical studies on corporatedemand for hedging and insurance. |
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Jean-Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole, Must-take cards: Merchant discounts and avoided costs, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 9 (3), 2011. (Journal Article)
Antitrust authorities often argue that merchants cannot reasonably turn down payment cards and therefore must accept excessively high merchant discounts. The paper attempts to shed light on this must-take cards view from two angles. First, the paper gives some operational content to the notion of must-take card through the avoided-cost test or tourist test: would the merchant want to refuse a card payment when a non-repeat customer with enough cash in her pocket is about to pay at the cash register? It analyzes its relevance as an indicator of excessive interchange fees. Second, it identifies four key sources of potential social biases in the payment card systems' determination of interchange fees and compares the industry and social optima both in the short term (fixed number of issuers) and the long term (in which issuer offerings and entry respond to profitability). |
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Jean-Charles Rochet, Charles Goodhart, Utvärdering av Riksbankens penningpolitik och arbete med finansiell stabilitet 2005-2010, 2011. (Studies and Reports Commissionned)
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Luca Taschini, Santiago Moreno-Bromberg, Pollution permits, Strategic Trading and Dynamic Technology Adoption, In: SSRN, No. 1786679, 2011. (Working Paper)
This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can both invest in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance
prices are generated endogenously and are inter-dependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value reflects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satised when a price support instrument (dubbed European-cash-for-permits), which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation conrms that this policy generates a Floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented. |
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Gilles Bénéplanc, Jean-Charles Rochet, Risk management in turbulent times, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011. (Book/Research Monograph)
DescriptionThe subprime crisis has shown that the sophisticated risk management models used by banks and insurance companies had serious flaws. Some people even suggest that these models are completely useless. Others claim that the crisis was just an unpredictable accident that was largely amplified by the lack of expertise and even naivety of many investors. This book takes the middle view. It shows that these models have been designed for "tranquil times", when financial markets behave smoothly and efficiently. However, we are living in more and more "turbulent times": large risks materialize much more often than predicted by "normal" models, financial models periodically go through bubbles and crashes. Moreover, financial risks result from the decisions of economic actors who can have incentives to take excessive risks, especially when their remunerations are ill designed. The book provides a clear account of the fundamental hypotheses underlying the most popular models of risk management and show that these hypotheses are flawed. However it shows that simple models can still be useful, provided they are well understood and used with caution. |
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Jean-Charles Rochet, Systemic risk: changing the regulatory perspective, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 6, 2010. (Journal Article)
The article puts forward the view that the regulatory perspective on systemic risk should be changed drastically. The sub-prime crisis has indeed revealed many loopholes in the supervisory/regulatory framework for banks—in particular, the inability to deal with the too-big-to-fail syndrome and also the lack of resiliency of interbank and money markets. To a large extent, the contagion phenomena that took place in these markets were the necessary outcomes of the passive attitude of banking supervisors, who have let large banks develop a complex and opaque nexus of bilateral obligations. We propose two reforms: adopting a platform-based (instead of institutionbased) regulatory perspective on systemic risk and encouraging a generalized move to central counterparty clearing. |
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Jean-Charles Rochet, An industrial organisation approach to the too-big-to-fail problem, Revue de la stabilité financière / Financial Stability Review, Vol. 14, 2010. (Journal Article)
This article suggests a reform of the organisation of money markets that would largely eliminate the risk
of contagion. The notion of “systemically important institution” would be replaced by that of systemically
important platform”. Such platforms would only be directly accessible to a group of “offi cially recognised
fi nancial institutions” that would have to comply with special regulatory requirements and would be directly
supervised by the central bank. The status of “offi cially recognised fi nancial institution” could be revoked by
the central bank if these special regulatory requirements are not satisfi ed. A special resolution procedure
would be created for these institutions, so that the central bank has the legal powers to close it down, or
at least restrict its activities before it is too late. OTC markets would still be active but, since they would
be penalised by regulation, it is likely that they would become small, and therefore not in a position to
jeopardise the entire system. |
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Jean-Charles Rochet, Doh-Shin Jeon, The pricing of academic journals: a two-sided market perspective, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 2 (2), 2010. (Journal Article)
More and more academic journals are adopting an open access policy by which articles are accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through author fees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on the quality standard of an electronic academic journal. If the journal's objective were to maximize social welfare, open access would be optimal. However, we show that if the journal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers' utility, the impact of the journal, or its profit), open access tends to induce it to choose a quality standard below the socially efficient level. |
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David Bardey, Jean-Charles Rochet, Competition among health plans: a two-sided market approach, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 19 (2), 2010. (Journal Article)
We set up a two-sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholders on one side and providers on the other. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two-sided framework allows us to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers' side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of the competition depends mainly on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on the providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO receives a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that by highlighting the two-sided market structure of the health plans' competition, our model provides a new insight to understand the increase in the PPOs' market share as observed in the USA during the last decade. |
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Bruno Biais, Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Charles Rochet, Stéphane Villeneuve, Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard, Econometrica, Vol. 78 (1), 2010. (Journal Article)
We study a continuous-time principal–agent model in which a risk-neutral agent with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but relatively infrequent losses. Firm size can be decreased at no cost or increased subject to adjustment costs. In the optimal contract, investment takes place only if a long enough period of time elapses with no losses occurring. Then, if good performance continues, the agent is paid. As soon as a loss occurs, payments to the agent are suspended, and so is investment if further losses occur. Accumulated bad performance leads to downsizing. We derive explicit formulae for the dynamics of firm size and its asymptotic growth rate, and we provide conditions under which firm size eventually goes to zero or grows without bounds. |
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Bruno Biais, Jean-Charles Rochet, Paul Woolley, Innovations, rents and risk, In: The Paul Woolley Centre Working Paper Series 13, No. 659, 2010. (Working Paper)
We offer a rational expectations model of the dynamics of innovative industries. The fundamentalvalue of innovations is uncertain and one must learn whether they are solid or fragile. Also, when theindustry is new, it is difficult to monitor managers and make sure they exert the effort necessary toreduce default risk. This gives rise to moral hazard. In this context, initial successes spur optimismand growth. But increasingly confident managers end up requesting large rents. If these becometoo high, investors give up on incentives, and default risk rises. Thus, moral hazard gives rise toendogenous crises and fat tails in the distribution of aggregate default risk. We calibrate our modelto fit the stylized facts of the MBS industry’s boom and bust cycle.2 |
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Thi Quynh Anh Vo, Banking competition, monitoring incentives and financial stability, In: Norges Bank Working Paper, No. 16, 2010. (Working Paper)
This paper addresses the desirability of competition in banking industry. In a model where banks compete on both deposit and loan markets and where banks can use monitoring technology to control entrepreneurs' behavior, we investigate three questions: what are the effects of competition on banks' monitoring incentives? Does competition hurt banks' stability? What can be devices to correct potential negative effects of competition vis à vis financial stability? We find that impacts of competition on banks' monitoring incentives can be decomposed into two effects: one on the attractiveness of monitoring and the other on the monitoring efficiency. The first effect operates through the link between competition and loan margin. The second effect comes from the fact that marginal effect of monitoring on entrepreneur's effort depends on loan rate. We characterize the sufficient condition under which competition will increase monitoring incentives as well as banks' stability. For the third question, we focus on the role of capital requirement and claim that with capital requirement, we can attain a weak correction but not strong correction. |
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Jean-Charles Rochet, Julian Wright, Credit card interchange fees, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 34 (8), 2010. (Journal Article)
We build a model of credit card pricing that explicitly takes into account credit functionality. In the model a monopoly card network always selects an interchange fee that exceeds the level that maximizes consumer surplus. If regulators only care about consumer surplus, a conservative regulatory approach is to cap interchange fees based on retailers’ net avoided costs from not having to provide credit themselves. This always raises consumer surplus compared to the unregulated outcome, sometimes to the point of maximizing consumer surplus. |
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Mathias Dewatripont, Jean-Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole, Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2010. (Book/Research Monograph)
The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States swept the world, producing substantial bank failures and forcing unprecedented state aid for the crippled global financial system. Bringing together three leading financial economists to provide an international perspective, Balancing the Banks draws critical lessons from the causes of the crisis and proposes important regulatory reforms, including sound guidelines for the ways in which distressed banks might be dealt with in the future.
While some recent policy moves go in the right direction, others, the book argues, are not sufficient to prevent another crisis. The authors show the necessity of an adaptive prudential regulatory system that can better address financial innovation. Stressing the numerous and complex challenges faced by politicians, finance professionals, and regulators, and calling for reinforced international coordination (for example, in the treatment of distressed banks), the authors put forth a number of principles to deal with issues regarding the economic incentives of financial institutions, the impact of economic shocks, and the role of political constraints.
Offering a global perspective, Balancing the Banks should be read by anyone concerned with solving the current crisis and preventing another such calamity in the future. |
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Ivar Ekeland, Santiago Moreno-Bromberg, An algorithm for computing solutions of variational problems with global convexity constraints, Numerische Mathematik, Vol. 115 (1), 2010. (Journal Article)
We present an algorithm to approximate the solutions to variational problems where set of admissible functions consists of convex functions. The main motivation behind the numerical method is to compute solutions to Adverse Selection problems within a Principal-Agent framework. Problems such as product lines design, optimal taxation, structured derivatives design, etc. can be studied through the scope of these models. We develop a method to estimate their optimal pricing schedules. |
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Thi Quynh Anh Vo, Optimality of prompt corrective action in a continuous - time model with recapitalization possibility, In: Norges Bank Working Paper, No. 28, 2009. (Working Paper)
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) is a system of predetermined capital/asset ratios that trigger supervisory actions by a banking regulator. Our paper addresses the optimality of this regulation system by adapting a dynamic model of entrepreneurial finance to banking regulation. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, we first derive the optimal contract between the banker and the regulator and then implement it by a menu of regulatory tools. Our main findings are the following: first, the insurance premium is a risk-based premium where the risk is measured by the capital level; second, our model implies a capital regulation system that shares several similarities with the US PCA. According to our proposed system, regulatory supervision should be realized in the spirit of gradual intervention and the book-value of capital is used as information to trigger intervention. Banks with high capital are not subject to any restrictions. Dividend distribution is prohibited in banks with intermediate level of capital. When banks have low capital level, a plan of recapitalization is required and in the worst case, banks are placed in liquidation. |
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Ulrich Horst, Santiago Moreno-Bromberg, Risk minimization and optimal derivative design in a principal agent game, Mathematics and Financial Economics, Vol. 2 (1), 2008. (Journal Article)
We consider the problem of Adverse Selection and optimal derivative design within a Principal–Agent framework. The principal’s income is exposed to non-hedgeable risk factors arising, for instance, from weather or climate phenomena. She evaluates her risk using a coherent and law invariant risk measure and tries minimize her exposure by selling derivative securities on her income to individual agents. The agents have mean–variance preferences with heterogeneous risk aversion coefficients. An agent’s degree of risk aversion is private information and hidden from the principal who only knows the overall distribution. We show that the principal’s risk minimization problem has a solution and illustrate the effects of risk transfer on her income by means of two specific examples. Our model extends earlier work of Barrieu and El Karoui (in Financ Stochast 9, 269–298, 2005) and Carlier et al. (in Math Financ Econ 1, 57–80, 2007). |
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