Hansjörg Lehmann, Managed Care. Kosten senken mit alternativen Krankenversicherungsformen? Eine empirische Analyse anhand Schweizer Krankenversicherungsdaten, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2002. (Dissertation)
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Lukas Steinmann, Konsistenzprobleme der Data Envelopment Analysis in der empirischen Forschung, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2002. (Dissertation)
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Dario Bonato, Peter Zweifel, Information about multiple risks: the case of building and content insurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 69 (4), 2002. (Journal Article)
Insurers traditionally use risk-specific characteristics of insureds to classify them according to risk. In this article, the practical relevance of information about multiple risks is demonstrated for the case of content insurance of a Swiss company. Two types of such information prove important: information about "spillover moral hazard" caused by mandated prevention affecting preventive effort in an unregulated line, and information about "common impulses" reflected in the loss experience of related lines. Both contribute to an improved prediction of loss probability. |
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Jacob Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Susan Laury, Incentives in Public Goods Experiments: Implications for the Environment, In: Recent Advances in Environmental Economics, Edwar Elgar Publisher, Cheltenham, p. 309 - 339, 2002. (Book Chapter)
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Jacob Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Learning in Economic Experiments, In: Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group, McMillan, London, p. 1060 - 1069, 2002. (Book Chapter)
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Jacob Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Coordination Games, In: Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group, McMillan, London, p. 204 - 208, 2002. (Book Chapter)
Coordination games typically possess multiple Nash equilibria, some of which are preferred by one or more players. Coordination on desired equilibria can be facilitated by communication, repetition, and introspection. |
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Jacob Goeree, Retiring Rich, In: Essays in Honor of Claus Weddepohl, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, p. 197 - 207, 2002. (Book Chapter)
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Jacob Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Susan K. Laury, Private costs and public benefits: unraveling the effects of altruism and noisy behavior, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 83 (2), 2002. (Journal Article)
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Jacob Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey, Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 104 (1), 2002. (Journal Article)
We give semiparametric identification and estimation results for econometric models with a regressor that is endogenous, bound censored and selected,called a Tobin regressor. First, we show that true parameter value is set identified and characterize the identification sets. Second, we propose novel estimation and inference methods for this true value. These estimation and inference methods are of independent interest and apply to any problem where the true parameter value is point identified conditional on some nuisance parameter values that are set-identified. By fixing the nuisance parameter value in some suitable region, we can proceed with regular point and interval estimation. Then, we take the union over nuisance parameter values of the point and interval estimates to form the final set estimates and confidence set estimates. The initial point or interval estimates can be frequentist or Bayesian. The final set estimates are set-consistent for the true parameter value, and confidence set estimates have frequentist validity in the sense of covering this value with at least a prespecified probability in large samples. We apply our identification, estimation, and inference procedures to study the effects of changes in housing wealth on household consumption. Our set estimates fall in plausible ranges, significantly above low OLS estimates and below high IV estimates that do not account for the Tobin regressor structure. |
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Jacob Goeree, Theo Offerman, Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study, American Economic Review, Vol. 92 (3), 2002. (Journal Article)
Auctions are generally not efficient when the object’s expected value depends on
private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction
experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially
motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey to the winner’s curse, they
weigh their private and common value information in roughly the same manner
as rational bidders, with observed efficiencies close to predicted levels. Increased
competition and reduced uncertainty about the common value positively
affect revenues and efficiency. The public release of information about the
common value also raises efficiency, although less than predicted. |
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Simon P. Anderson, Jacob Goeree, Charles A. Holt, The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 69 (1), 2002. (Journal Article)
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C. Monica Capra, Jacob Goeree, Rosario Gomez, Charles A Holt, Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition, International Economic Review, Vol. 43 (3), 2002. (Journal Article)
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Christian Ewerhart, Comments on: "The Dutch UMTS Auction" by Eric van Damme, ifo-Studien, 2002. (Journal Article)
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Christian Ewerhart, B Moldovanu, The German UMTS Design: Insights from Multi-Object Auction Theory, ifo-Studien, Vol. 48, 2002. (Journal Article)
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Christian Ewerhart, Zielgenaue Planung und Steuerung ermöglichen: Erfahrungen mit der Implementierung des Shareholder-Value-Ansatzes bei einem international tätigen Börsenunternehmen, Controlling, 2002. (Journal Article)
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Christian Ewerhart, Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 107 (2), 2002. (Journal Article)
We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is solvable in n−1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies— regardless of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game. |
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Christian Ewerhart, Backward induction and the game-theoretic analysis of chess, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 39 (2), 2002. (Journal Article)
The paper scrutinizes various stylized facts related to the minmax theorem for chess. We first point out that, in contrast to the prevalent understanding, chess is actually an infinite game, so that backward induction does not apply in the strict sense. Second, we recall the original
argument for the minmax theorem of chess – which is forward rather than backward looking. Then it is shown that, alternatively, the minmax theorem for the infinite version of chess can be reduced to the minmax theorem of the usually employed finite version. The paper concludes with a comment on Zermelo’s (1913) non-repetition theorem. |
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Andreas Polk, The economics of lobbying and special interest groups, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2002. (Dissertation)
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Josef Falkinger, Employability and the costs of organizing work, In: The Economics of Skills Obsolescence: Research in Labor Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley UK, p. 145 - 219, 2002. (Book Chapter)
A new macroeconomic equilibrium theory is presented which gives a rigorous economic foundation of the notion of employability. Employability depends on the one side on the workers' interactive abilities, but on the other side also on the skill requirements implied by the organizational environment provided by firms. It is shown that the range of abilities which is considered as unemployable by the firms varies with the competitive pressure in the goods market as well as with the used organization methods. Under fairly general conditions the resulting level of equilibrium employment is lower than the efficient level. |
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Josef Falkinger, A Theory of Employment in Firms: Macroeconomic Equilibrium and Internal Organization of Work, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2002. (Book/Research Monograph)
: Physica-Verlag, 2002
Umfang 205 S. : Ill.
Reihe (Contributions to economics)
Bibliogr. Includes bibliographical references and index
ISBN Link(softcover : alk. paper) |
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