Contributions published at Department of Economics (Florian Scheuer)

The apprenticeship system is the most important source of formal post-secondary training in Germany. Using German register data - the IAB Employment Sample - we find that apprentices staying with their training firm after graduation have longer first-job durations but not higher wages than apprentices leaving the training firm. Retention rates, first job durations, and post-apprenticeship wages are all increasing functions of training intensity. Some implications for the ongoing debate as to why firms are willing to invest in general training are discussed.

The German health care reform of 1997 provides a natural experiment for evaluating the price sensitivity of demand for physicians’ services. As part of the reform, copayments for prescription drugs were increased by up to 200 percent. However, certain groups of people were exempted from the increase, providing a natural control group against which the changed demand for physicians’ services of the treated, those subject to increased co-payments, can be assessed. The differences-in-differences estimates indicate that increased co-payments reduced the number of doctor visits by about 10 percent on average.

We examine cost-reducing investment in vertically-related oligopolies, where firms may be vertically integrated or separated. Analyzing a standard linear Cournot model, we show that: (i) Integrated firms invest more than separated competitors. (ii) Vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment. (iii) Firms may integrate strategically so as to preempt investments by competitors. Adopting a reduced-form approach, we identify demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market as the driving force for these results. We show that our results generalize naturally beyond the Cournot example, and we discuss policy implications.

Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence are advanced to bolster the claim that direct political participation via referenda and initiatives constitutes an advanced form of democracy with beneficial effects on Transition Countries.nDirect democracy raises trust and honesty and improves social outcomes. Per capita incomes and subjective well-being are raised.nStandard arguments against direct democracy (citizens' incompetence and lacking interest, danger of manipulation and emotionality, hindering progress and destroying civil rights, high cost) are rejected.nElements of direct democracy can be introduced at the national and local levels, and then proceeding further. Citizens should have the right to govern this process.n

This paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria. We find that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market. If firms anticipate the impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices, there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals’ costs. We illustrate our analysis using a linear Cournot model.

This paper examines the consequences of introducing mobile number portability (MNP). As MNP allows consumers to keep their telephone number when switching providers, it reduces consumers’ switching costs. However, MNP may also cause consumer ignorance if telephone numbers no longer identify networks. As a result, while fostering competition for mobile customers, MNP may also induce operators to increase termination charges for calls to mobile networks, generating ambiguous welfare e.ects. We examine how extensions such as MNP based on call-forwarding, termination fee regulation, and alternative means of carrier identification a.ect these findings.

"People behave pro-socially in a wide variety of situations that standard economic theory is unable to explain. Social comparison is one explanation for such pro-social behavior: people contribute if others contribute or cooperate as well. This paper tests social comparison in a field experiment at the University of Zurich. Each semester every single student has to decide whether he or shenwants to contribute to two Social Funds. We provided 2500 randomly selected students with information about the average behavior of the student population. Some received the information that a high percentage of the student population contributed, while others received the information that a relatively low percentage contributed. The results show that people behave pro-socially, conditional on others. The more others cooperate, the more one is inclined to do so as well. The type of person is important. We are able to fix the ‘types’ by looking at revealed past behavior. Some persons seem to care more about the pro-social behavior of others, while other ‘types’ are not affected by the average behavior of the reference group."

This paper discusses long-term trends in the macroeconomic growthnperformance and in income distribution in Europe and the U.S. We reviewninsights from the recent macroeconomic literature on inequality and growthnuse these insights to shed light on the growth and inequality trends.

In this paper we study the inefficiencies of the monetary equilibrium and optimal monetary policies in a search economy. We show that the same frictions that give fiat money a positive value generate an inefficient quantity of goods in each trade and an inefficient number of trades (or search decisions). The Friedman rule eliminates the first inefficiency and the Hosios rule the second. A monetary equilibrium attains the social optimum if and only if both rules are satisfied. When the two rules cannot be satisfied simultaneously, which occurs in a large set of economies, optimal monetary policy achieves only the second best. We analyze when the second-best monetary policy exceeds the Friedman rule and when it obeys the Friedman rule. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to an economy with barter and show how the Hosios rule must be modified in order to internalize all search externalities.

"with Divisible Money *nAleksander Berentsen†nEconomics Department (WWZ), University of Basel, SwitzerlandnGuillaume Rocheteau‡nSchool of Economics, Australian National University, AustralianApril 14th, 2003nAbstractnThis paper studies the validity of the Friedman rule in a search model with divisi-blenmoney and divisible goods where the terms of trades are determined endogenously.nWe show that ex post bargaining generates a holdup problem similar to the one em-phasizednin the labour-market literature. Buyers cannot obtain the full return that annadditional unit of money provides to the match, which makes the purchasing power ofnmoney ine .ciently low in equilibrium. Consequently, even though the Friedman rulenmaximizes the purchasing power of money, it fails to generate the first-best allocationnof resources unless buyers have all the bargaining power."

"Money *nAleksander BerentsennEconomics Departement, University of Basel, SwitzerlandnJune 10, 2003nAbstractnThis paper considers a monopolist’s supply of outside paper money in a random-matchingnmodel with divisible money and divisible goods. When binding supplynannouncements are feasible, the revenue-maximizing policy is characterized by anninitial period where the monopolist initiates a currency reform which destroys thenvalue of any old currency, and then issues new money, which the issuer taxes thereafternwith a constant gross growth rate of money. It is shown that this policy is time-consistentnif the trading history of the issuer is public information and if moneyndemanders respond to the relevation of defection by playing autarky."

This paper examines the distributional effects of international outsourcing in a two-sector, two-factor model. The analysis allows for switches between diversified and specialized equilibria. Also, equilibria in which only some firms of a sector outsource (incomplete or partial outsourcing) are considered. It is the interplay of the cost-saving and substitution effects of international outsourcing that determines the nature of the outsourcing equilibrium and its distributional consequences.

Intertemporal models of the current account generally assume that global shocks do not affect the current account. We use this assumption to identify global and country-specific shocks in a bivariate VAR of output and the current account. Cross-country evidence from the G7 economies suggests that this identification works surprisingly well. We then employ our method to collect stylized facts on international macroeconomic fluctuations. We find that long-term output growth is driven mainly by global factors in most G7 countries and that country-specific shocks are less persistent and generally less volatile than global shocks.

Business students are portrayed as behaving too egoistically. The critics call for more socialnresponsibility and good citizenship behavior on the part of business students. We present evidence ofnpro-social behavior in business students. Every student at the University of Zurich has to decide eachnsemester whether he/she wants to contribute to two social funds administrated by the University. Withnthis large panel data set, we can analyze whether business students indeed behave less pro-socially thannother students. Two specific hypotheses are tested: do students select into business studies or does thentraining in business studies indoctrinate students in a negative way? The evidence suggests that therenmay be a selection effect going on. Therefore, economics education does not change the citizenshipnbehavior of business students.

This paper provides a survey of recent experimental work in eco-nnomics focussing on social and economic networks.The experimentsnconsider networks of coordination and cooperation,buyer-seller net-nworks,and network formation.

Field evidence suggests that agents belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly,ni.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. Testing for such effects raises severenidentification problems. We conduct an experiment that avoids these problems. The mainndesign feature is that each subject simultaneously is a member of two randomly assigned andneconomically identical groups where only members ("neighbors") are different. In both groupsnsubjects make contribution decisions to a public good. We speak of social interactions if thensame subject at the same time makes group-specific contributions that depend on theirnrespective neighbors' contribution. Our results are unambiguous evidence for socialninteractions. A majority of subjects is very strongly influenced by the contributions of theirnrespective neighbors. Roughly ten percent exhibit no social interactions.

"Happiness research in economics takes reported subjective well-being as a proxynmeasure for utility and has already provided many interesting insights about human well-beingnand its determinants. We argue that future research on happiness in economics has a lot ofnpotential, but that it needs to be guided more by theory. We propose two ways to test theories ofnhappiness, and illustrate them with two applications. First, reported subjective well-being canncontribute towards a new understanding of utility in economics. Here, we study the introductionnof income aspirations in individuals’ utility functions in order to improve our understanding ofnhow income affects individual well-being. Second, happiness data offers a new possibility ofndiscriminating between different models of behavior. This is studied for theories of marriage,nwhich crucially depend on auxiliary assumptions as to what contributes to well-being innmarriage. Both applications are empirically tested with panel data for Germany."

Under certain conditions the optimal insurance policy will offer full coverage above a deductible, as Arrow and others have shown long time ago. Interestingly, the same design of insurance policies applies in case of a single loss and ex-ante moral hazard. However, many insurance policies provide coverage against a variety of losses and the possibilities for the insured to affect the probabilities of each possible loss might be substantially different. The optimal design of a insurance contract providing coverage against different losses therefore should generally differ from the standard form under moral hazard. The paper concentrates on the conditions under which the standard insurance contract holds under moral hazard and more than one loss. It gives some evidence that many insurance contracts should be split up. The main result is, that the relative changes of probabilities due to precautious activities are decisive. On the other hand, under moral hazard it is rarely ever optimal to combine two losses in one insurance contract prescribing only a single deductible for both losses if both losses can occur simultaneously.

This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting, where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution. A key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution, since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters. The model features multiple equilibria. In some equilibria, positive redistribution persists forever. In other equilibria, even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period. Skill-biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely.