Contributions published at Department of Economics (Florian Scheuer)

I study the role of industries’ position in supply chains in shaping the transmission of final demand shocks. First, I use a shift-share design based on destination-specific final demand shocks and destination exposure shares to show that shocks amplify upstream. Quantitatively, upstream industries respond to final demand shocks up to three times as much as final goods producers. To organize the reduced form results, I develop a tractable production network model with inventories and study how the properties of the network and the cyclicality of inventories interact to determine whether final demand shocks amplify or dissipate upstream. I test the mechanism by directly estimating the model-implied relationship between output growth and demand shocks, mediated by network position and inventories. I find evidence of the role of inventories in explaining heterogeneous output elasticities. Finally, I use the model to quantitatively study how inventories and network properties shape the volatility of the economy.

When a sample combines data from two or more groups, multivariate regression yields a matrix-weighted average of the group-specific coefficient vectors. However, it is possible that the weighted average of a specific coefficient falls outside the range of the group-specific coefficients, and it may even have a different sign compared to both group-level coefficients, a manifestation of Simpson's paradox. The result of the combined regression is then prone to misinterpretation. The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness of this problem and to state conditions under which such non-convex weighting or sign reversal can arise, for a model with two regressors and two groups. Two illustrative examples, an investment equation estimated with panel data, and a cross-sectional earnings equation for men and women, highlight the relevance of these findings for applied work.

This paper provides a novel theory of research joint ventures for financially constrained firms. When firms choose R&D portfolios, an RJV can help to coordinate research efforts, reducing investments in duplicate projects. This can free up resources, increase the variety of pursued projects and thereby increase the probability of discovering the innovation. RJVs improve innovation outcomes when market competition is weak or external financing conditions are bad. An RJV may increase the innovation probability and nevertheless lower total R&D costs. RJVs that increase innovation also increase consumer surplus and tend to be profitable, but innovation-reducing RJVs also exist. Finally, we compare RJVs to innovation-enhancing mergers.

This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that, in spite of countervailing incentives on incumbents and entrants, prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative overall innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect and, in particular, conditions under which it is zero. We further analyze the effects of less restrictive policies, including merger remedies and the tax treatment of acquisitions and initial public offerings. Such interventions tend to prevent acquisitions only if the entrant has sufficiently high stand-alone profits.

We investigate the causal impact of public discourse on socially responsible market behavior. Across three laboratory experiments, having market participants engage in public discourse generally increases market social responsibility. These positive impacts are robust to variation in several characteristics of the discourse and appear to be partly driven by strengthening beliefs that others support socially responsible exchange. However, relaxing requirements to engage in discourse sharply reduces its effectiveness. Our findings suggest that campaigns encouraging discussion of appropriate market behavior can have powerful impacts on addressing inefficiencies due to market failures, but that policies encouraging broad public engagement may be important.

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog reveals her type in an attempt to moderate the favorite while, similarly, the strongest type of the favorite tries to discourage the underdog––so that the contest unravels. This strong-form disclosure principle is robust with respect to correlation, partitional evidence, randomized disclosures, sequential moves, and continuous type spaces. Moreover, the assumption of uniform asymmetry is not needed when incomplete information is one-sided. However, the principle breaks down when contestants are potentially too similar in strength, possess commitment power, or when information is unverifiable. In fact, cheap talk will always be ignored, even if mediated by a trustworthy third party.

A growing body of research has placed the ventral striatum at the center of a network of cerebral regions involved in anticipating rewards in healthy controls. However, little is known about the functional connectivity of the ventral striatum associated with reward anticipation in healthy controls. In addition, few studies have investigated reward anticipation in healthy humans with different levels of schizotypy. Here, we investigated reward anticipation in eighty-four healthy individuals (44 females) recruited based on their schizotypy scores. Participants performed a variant of the Monetary Incentive Delay Task while undergoing event-related fMRI.Participants showed the expected decrease in response times for highly rewarded trials compared to non-rewarded trials. Whole-brain activation analyses replicated previous results, including activity in the ventral and dorsal striatum. Whole-brain psycho-physiological interaction analyses of the left and right ventral striatum revealed increased connectivity during reward anticipation with widespread regions in frontal, parietal and occipital cortex as well as the cerebellum and midbrain. Finally, we found no association between schizotypal personality severity and neural activity and cortico-striatal functional connectivity. In line with the motivational, attentional, and motor functions of rewards, our data reveal multifaceted cortico-striatal networks taking part in reward anticipation in healthy individuals. The ventral striatum is connected to regions of the salience, attentional, motor and visual networks during reward anticipation and thereby in a position to orchestrate optimal goal-directed behavior.

We study the economic and political consequences of the 2018-2019 trade war between the United States, China and other U.S. trade partners at the detailed geographic level, exploiting measures of local exposure to U.S. import tariffs, foreign retaliatory tariffs, and U.S. compensation programs. So far, the trade-war has not provided economic help to the U.S. heartland: import tariffs on foreign goods neither raised nor lowered U.S. employment in newly-protected sectors; retaliatory tariffs had clear negative employment impacts, primarily in agriculture; and these harms were only partly mitigated by compensatory U.S. agricultural subsidies. Nevertheless, consistent with expressive views of politics, the tariff war appears to have been a political success for the governing Republican party. Residents of regions more exposed to import tariffs became less likely to identify as Democrats, more likely to vote to reelect Donald Trump in 2020, and more likely to elect Republicans to Congress. Foreign retaliatory tariffs only modestly weakened that support.

Ob Klimakrise oder Bankenrettungen, Pensionskassenreform oder globale Steuergerechtigkeit, Corona-Bilanz oder Explosion der Lebenshaltungskosten: Die Frage, wie gesellschaftliche Gewinne und Kosten angemessen verteilt werden sollen, bereitet Politikern schlaflose Nächte und führt zunehmend zu Demonstrationen und Protestaktionen. Warum beschäftigt uns Fairness so sehr? Und warum tun wir uns schwer, für alle zufriedenstellende Lösungen zu finden?

When supplying information, agents choose between options that differ both in their contents and in their costs. We establish a “cost-over-content” theorem for a large class of dynamic trading environments where buyers choose from arbitrary sets of processes (experiments) that reveal information to the seller. When all experiments are equally costly, choosing any given experiment is a perfect equilibrium. However, when experiments differ in costs, there is a unique equilibrium: all buyers choose the cheapest experiment, regardless of the information it pro- vides. We explore implications for market performance, privacy, data sale, and defaults in market regulation.

Can two parties reach an ex-post Pareto efficient trade agreement? The importance of the question was elucidated by Coase (1960), and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) provided a commonly accepted negative answer that such agreement is impossible when the parties are privately informed. We show that this negative answer depends on the assumption of quasi-linear preferences: efficient trade is possible if risk- aversion or wealth effects are sufficiently large or if agents’ utility is not too responsive to private information. Under empirically-grounded specifications of risk aversion and elasticity of trade, two parties can trade efficiently despite substantial asymmetry of information.

This paper applies principles of adverse selection to overcome obstacles that prevent the implementation of Pigouvian policies to internalize externalities. Focusing on negative externalities from production (such as pollution), we consider settings in which aggregate emissions are known, but individual contributions are unobserved by the government. We evaluate a policy that gives firms the option to pay a tax on their voluntarily and verifiably disclosed emissions, or pay an output tax based on the average rate of emissions among the undisclosed firms. The certification of relatively clean firms raises the output-based tax, setting off a process of unraveling in favor of disclosure. We derive sufficient statistics formulas to calculate the welfare of such a program relative to mandatory output or emissions taxes. We find that the voluntary certification mechanism would deliver significant gains over output-based taxation in two empirical applications: methane emissions from oil and gas fields, and carbon emissions from imported steel.

Top income inequality in the United States has increased considerably within occupations. This phenomenon has led to a search for a common explanation. We instead develop a theory where increases in income inequality originating within a few occupations can “spill over” through consumption into others. We show theoretically that such spillovers occur when an occupation provides non-divisible services to consumers, with physicians our prime example. Examining local income inequality across U.S. regions, the data suggest that such spillovers exist for physicians, dentists, and real estate agents. Estimated spillovers for other occupations are consistent with the predictions of our theory.

The degree of certainty that decision-makers have about their evaluations of available choice alternatives and their confidence about selecting the subjectively best alternative are important factors that affect current and future value-based choices. Assessments of the alternatives in a given choice set are rarely unidimensional; their values are usually derived from a combination of multiple distinct attributes. For example, the taste, texture, quantity, and nutritional content of a snack food may all be considered when determining whether to consume it. We examined how certainty about the levels of individual attributes of an option relates to certainty about the overall value of that option as a whole and/or to confidence in having chosen the subjectively best available option. We found that certainty and confidence are derived from unequally weighted combinations of attribute certainties rather than simple, equal combinations of all sources of uncertainty. Attributes that matter more in determining choice outcomes also are weighted more in metacognitive evaluations of certainty or confidence. Moreover, we found that the process of deciding between two alternatives leads to refinements in both attribute estimations and the degree of certainty in those estimates. Attributes that are more important in determining choice outcomes are refined more during the decision process in terms of both estimates and certainty. Although certainty and confidence are typically treated as unidimensional, our results indicate that they, like value estimates, are subjective, multidimensional constructs.

How costly is the misallocation of production that we might expect to result from distortions such as market power, incomplete contracts, taxes, regulations, or corruption? This paper develops new tools for the study of misallocation that place minimal assumptions on firms’ underlying technologies and behavior. We show how features of the distribution of marginal products can be identified from exogenous variation in firms’ input use, and how these features can be used both to test for misallocation and to quantify the welfare losses that it causes. We then consider an application in which thousands of firms experience demand shocks derived from a lottery-based assignment of public procurement contracts for construction services in Ecuador. Using administrative tax data about these firms, we reject the null of efficiency but estimate that the welfare losses resulting from misallocation are only 1.6% relative to the first-best. Standard parametric assumptions applied to the same setting would suggest losses that are at least an order of magnitude larger.

We develop a flexible two-equation copula model to address endogeneity of medical expenditures in a distribution regression for health. The expenditure margin uses the compound gamma distribution, a special case of the Tweedie family of distributions, to account for a spike at zero and a highly skewed continuous part. An efficient estimation algorithm offers flexible choices of copulae and link functions, including logit, probit and cloglog for the health margin. Our empirical application revisits data from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. In the joint model, using random insurance plan assignment as instrument for spending, a $1000 increase is estimated to reduce the probability of a low post-program mental health index by 1.9 percentage points. The effect is not statistically significant. Ignoring endogeneity leads to a spurious positive effect estimate.

We study same-sex role model effects of teachers with a meta-analysis and our own study of three million students in 90 countries. Both approaches show that role model effects on performance are, on average, small: 0.030 SD in the meta-analysis and 0.015 SD in our multi-country study. Going beyond test scores, our multi-country study documents larger average role model effects on job preferences (0.063 SD). To understand the universality of these effects, we estimate the distributions of country-level same-sex role model effects. Although role model effects on test scores appear universally small, we find substantial cross-country variation for job preferences, with larger effects in countries with larger gender gaps. These results are consistent with role models inspiring students to overcome gender stereotypes and pursue a STEM career. However, in countries with negligible gender gaps, role models do not seem to have this equalizing function.

We present a test of Coasean theories of efficient separations. We study a cohort of jobs from the introduction through the repeal of a large age- and region-specific unemployment benefit extension in Austria. In the treatment group, 18.5% fewer jobs survive the program period. According to the Coasean view, the destroyed marginal jobs had low joint surplus. Hence, after the repeal, the treatment survivors should be more resilient than the ineligible control group survivors. Strikingly, the two groups instead exhibit identical post-repeal separation behaviour. We provide, and find suggestive evidence consistent with, an alternative model in which wage rigidity drives the inefficient separation dynamics.

We combine Tyler's robust estimator of the dispersion matrix with nonlinear shrinkage. This approach delivers a simple and fast estimator of the dispersion matrix in elliptical models that is robust against both heavy tails and high dimensions. We prove convergence of the iterative part of our algorithm and demonstrate the favorable performance of the estimator in a wide range of simulation scenarios. Finally, an empirical application demonstrates its state-of-the-art performance on real data.

This paper investigates worker bargaining power evolution over the last decades and its consequences on the American and French labor markets. I use a framework where wages and marginal productivity of labor are linked by a negotiation process, allowing the bargaining power of the parties involved to vary over time. I uncover a sizable disproportion between employees and employers in salary negotiation by estimating an average worker bargaining power of 17% in the U.S. and 25% in France. However, these average estimates mask an aggregate declining trend in both countries since the 90s. Worker bargaining power followed a hump-shaped trend in the U.S. over the last 60 years, peaking in the 80s and then halving until nowadays. In France, it has also been declining steadily over the last 30 years. These patterns help explain the low unemployment and wage growth over the last decades: firms exploited the low level of worker bargaining power to hire an inefficiently high number of employees. I propose marginal wage and profit taxes to restore labor market efficiency. Technological advancement, regulation, trade, and outsourcing seem to play a minor role in the decline of bargaining power.