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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Credit Default Cascades: When Does Risk Diversification Increase Stability?
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Stefano Battiston
  • Domenico Delli Gatti
  • Mauro Gallegati
  • Bruce Greenwald
  • Joseph E Stiglitz
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Journal of Financial Stability
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 1572-3089
Volume 8
Number 3
Page Range 138 - 149
Date 2012
Abstract Text We explore the dynamics of default cascades in a network of credit interlink-ages in which each agent is at the same time a borrower and a lender. When some counterparties of an agent default, the loss she experiences amounts to her total exposure to those counterparties. A possible conjecture in this context is that individual risk diversification across more numerous counterparties should make also systemic defaults less likely. We show that this view is not always true. In particular, the diversification of credit risk across many borrowers has ambiguous effects on systemic risk in the presence of mechanisms of loss amplifications such as in the presence of potential runs among the short-term lenders of the agents in the network.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.jfs.2012.01.002
Other Identification Number merlin-id:9837
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