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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types
Organization Unit
  • Christian Ewerhart
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number 159
ISSN 1664-7041 (P) 1664-705X (E)
Number of Pages 11
Date 2014
Abstract Text It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Keywords Rent-seeking, private information, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, existence, uniqueness, Marktgleichgewicht, Wettbewerb, Gleichgewichtstheorie, Ressourcenallokation