Not logged in.

Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Targeted vs. collective information sharing in networks
Organization Unit
  • Alexey Kushnir
  • Alexandru Nichifor
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number 152
ISSN 1664-7041
Number of Pages 25
Date 2014
Abstract Text We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing. Agents value being connected to other agents and sharing and receiving information. We consider multiple utility specifications. We show that the game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies and then we study how the network design and the utility specifications affect welfare. Surprisingly, we find that in general, targeted information sharing is not necessarily better than collective information sharing. However, if all agents are either "babblers" or "friends", irrespective of whether the network is unilateral or bilateral, in equilibrium, targeted information sharing yields higher welfare than collective information sharing.
Official URL
Related URLs
PDF File Download from ZORA
Export BibTeX
Keywords Networks, network formation, unilateral connections, bilateral connections, targeted information sharing, collective information sharing, Google, Facebook, babblers, friends, Netzwerk, soziales Netzwerk, Facebook, Google, Google+, Beziehungen