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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
Organization Unit
  • Christian Ewerhart
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number 143
ISSN 1664-7041
Number of Pages 19
Date 2014
Abstract Text Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter ("2 < R < ∞") has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being "halfhearted," which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed, and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction.
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Keywords Tullock contest, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, analytical functions, Auktionstheorie, analytische Funktionen