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Type	Working Paper
Scope	Discipline-based scholarship
Title	The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power
Organization Unit	Department of Economics (Florian Scheuer)
Authors	Ernst Fehr Holger Herz Tom Wilkening
Language	English
Institution	University of Zurich : UBS International Center of Economics in Society
Series Name	UBS Center Working Paper Series
Number	2
ISSN	2296-2751
Number of Pages	19
Date	2012
Abstract Text	Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest – suggesting that authority has non-pecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to over-provision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates under-provide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices.
Official URL	http://www.ubscenter.uzh.ch/assets/workingpapers/WP2_Lure_of_Authority.pdf
Related URLs	https://www.ubscenter.uzh.ch/de/publications/working_papers.html
PDF File	Download from ZORA
Export	BibTeX EP3 XML (ZORA)
Keywords	Organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts