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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | The provision point mechanism with reward money |
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| Authors |
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| Language |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 114 |
| ISSN | 1664-7041 |
| Number of Pages | 20 |
| Date | 2013 |
| Abstract Text | We modify the provision point mechanism by introducing reward money, which is distributed among the contributors in proportion to their contributions only when the provision point is not reached. In equilibrium, the provision point is always reached as competition for reward money and preference for the public good induce sufficient contributions. In environments without aggregate uncertainty, the mechanism not only ensures allocative efficiency but also distributional. At a specific level of reward money, there is a unique equilibrium, where all consumers contribute the same proportion of their private valuations. The advantages of the mechanism are also demonstrated for collective action problems. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp114.pdf |
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| Keywords | Public goods, private provision, provision point mechanism, aggregative game, distributional efficiency, collective action problem, Öffentliches Gut, Kollektives Handeln, Trittbrettfahrerverhalten |
| Additional Information | Revised version |