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Type	Working Paper
Scope	Discipline-based scholarship
Title	Growing groups, cooperation, and the rate of entry
Organization Unit	Economics of Corporate Culture, Business Ethics and Social Responsiblity (Roberto A. Weber)
Authors	Eva Ranehill Frédéric-Guillaume Schneider Roberto A. Weber
Language	English
Institution	University of Zurich
Series Name	Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number	103
ISSN	1664-7041
Number of Pages	44
Date	2013
Abstract Text	We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying group growth rates. Using a laboratory public-good game, we construct a situation where increasing group size yields potential efficiency gains, but only with sustained cooperation. We then study the effect of exogenously varying growth rates on cooperation. Slow growth yields higher cooperation rates and welfare than fast growth, both for incumbents and entrants, which is consistent with optimistic self-reinforcing beliefs persisting under slower growth. Allowing incumbent group members to select growth rates also sustains high cooperation rates, but growth stalls at intermediate group sizes, leaving potential efficiency gains unrealized.
Related URLs	http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/research/workingpapers.html
Other Identification Number	merlin-id:7775
PDF File	Download from ZORA
Export	BibTeX EP3 XML (ZORA)
Keywords	Voluntary cooperation, experiment, public good game, experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, öffentliches Gut, Kooperation, kooperatives Verhalten, Experiment
Additional Information	Revised version