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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model with persistent leadership |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 78 |
| ISSN | 1664-7041 |
| Number of Pages | 54 |
| Date | 2012 |
| Abstract Text | This article analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model in which incumbent firms preemptively innovate in order to keep their position of leadership. Unlike in models with leapfrogging, granting non-expiring forward protection reduces the rate of innovation and imposing a non-obviousness requirement reduces R&D spending. It is shown that full protection against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes the average innovation rate. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp078.pdf |
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| Keywords | Intellectual property rights, persistent leadership, cumulative innovation, preemption, forward protection, non-obviousness requirement, patent policy, Immaterialgüterrecht, geistiges Eigentum, Marktführer, Innovation |