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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Paying Not to Go to the Gym
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Ulrike Malmendier
  • Stefano Della Vigna
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title American Economic Review
Publisher American Economic Association
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0002-8282
Volume 96
Number 3
Page Range 694 - 719
Date 2006
Abstract Text How do consumers choose from a menu of contracts? We analyze a novel dataset from three U.S. health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day-to-day attendance decisions of 7,752 members over three years. The observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs. First, members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over \$70 attend on average 4.3 times per month. They pay a price per expected visit of more than \$17, even though they could pay \$10 per visit using a 10-visit pass. On average, these users forgo savings of \$600 during their membership. Second, consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year. This is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month. We also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations, among other findings. Leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self-control or about future efficiency. Overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts. Our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences.
Free access at DOI
Digital Object Identifier 10.1257/aer.96.3.694
Other Identification Number merlin-id:5953
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