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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
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Language |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
Number | No. 19 |
ISSN | 1424-0459 |
Date | 2002 |
Abstract Text | "Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that in the repeated game some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that a long-term interaction is a “reciprocity-compatible” contract enforcement device." |
Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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