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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fairness? Evidence from Russia
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Ernst Fehr
  • Urs Fischbacher
  • Elena Tougareva
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Number No. 120
ISSN 1424-0459
Date 2002
Abstract Text This paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in which subjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours. In the high stake condition subjects earned between two and three times their monthly income during the experiment. In the normal stake condition the stake level was reduced by a factor of ten. We observe that both in the high and the normal stake condition fairness concerns are strong enough to outweigh competitive forces and give rise to non-competitive wages. There is also no evidence that effort behaviour becomes generally more selfish at higher stake levels. Therefore, our results suggest that, contrary to common beliefs, fairness concerns may play an important role even at relatively high stake levels.
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