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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Bruno Frey
  • Simon Luechinger
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Number No. 137
ISSN 1424-0459
Date 2002
Abstract Text Deterrence has been a crucial element in fighting terrorism, both in actual politics and rational choice analyses of terrorism. But there are superior strategies to deterrence. One is to make terrorist attacks less attractive. Another to raise the opportunity cost – rather than the material cost – to terrorists. These alternative strategies effectively dissuade potential terrorists. The strategies suggested here build on the “benevolence” system and tend to produce a positive sum game among the interacting parties. In contrast, the deterrence system is based on “threats” and tends to produce a negative sum game interaction.
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