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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Lobbying against Environmental Regulation vs. Lobbying for Loopholes |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
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Language |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute |
Number | No. 301 |
Date | 2003 |
Abstract Text | We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying. |
Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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