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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Multiple behavioral rules in Cournot oligopolies
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Carlos Alos-Ferrer
  • Alexander Ritschel
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0167-2681
Volume 183
Page Range 250 - 267
Date 2021
Abstract Text We study intra-individual behavioral heterogeneity in an experimental Cournot oligopoly. Previous empirical results in this setting have demonstrated convergence to competitive outcomes, in agreement with theoretical predictions assuming that players imitate successful opponents. We postulate that players sometimes rely on imitation of successful behavior, and sometimes best reply to the actions of others. Testable predictions are obtained from a model allowing for multiple behavioral rules which accounts for differences in the cognitive nature of the underlying decision processes. Those include non-trivial response time interactions depending on whether the rules share a common prescription (alignment) or not (conflict), a classification which is ex ante observable. The results confirm the hypotheses and support the presence of multiple behavioral rules at the individual level.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.034
Other Identification Number merlin-id:20671
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Keywords Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Cournot oligopoly, Imitation, Best reply, Multiple behavioral rules