Not logged in.

Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Imitation, network size, and efficiency
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Carlos Alos-Ferrer
  • Johannes Buckenmaier
  • Federica Farolfi
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Network Science
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 2050-1242
Volume 9
Number 1
Page Range 123 - 133
Date 2021
Abstract Text A number of theoretical results have provided sufficient conditions for the selection of payoff-efficient equilibria in games played on networks when agents imitate successful neighbors and make occasional mistakes (stochastic stability). However, those results only guarantee full convergence in the long-run, which might be too restrictive in reality. Here, we employ a more gradual approach relying on agent-based simulations avoiding the double limit underlying these analytical results. We focus on the circular-city model, for which a sufficient condition on the population size relative to the neighborhood size was identified by Alós-Ferrer &amp; Weidenholzer [(2006) <jats:italic>Economics Letters</jats:italic>, <jats:italic>93</jats:italic>, 163–168]. Using more than 100,000 agent-based simulations, we find that selection of the efficient equilibrium prevails also for a large set of parameters violating the previously identified condition. Interestingly, the extent to which efficiency obtains decreases gradually as one moves away from the boundary of this condition.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1017/nws.2020.43
Other Identification Number merlin-id:20113
PDF File Download from ZORA
Export BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
Keywords Sociology and Political Science, Communication, Social Psychology, agent-based models, pareto efficiency, risk dominance, imitation, networks, stochastic stability