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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title “Sorry, We're Closed" Bank Branch Closures, Loan Pricing, and Information Asymmetries
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Diana Bonfim
  • Gil Nogueira
  • Steven Ongena
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name SSRN
Number 2749155
ISSN 1556-5068
Date 2020
Abstract Text We study local loan conditions when, under external pressure, banks close branches. After the closure of nearby branches of their credit granting banks, firms that locally and hurriedly transfer to other banks receive an equivalent interest rate. However, and in stark contrast, where branch closures do not take place firms that purposely switch banks receive a 63 basis points discount. At the same time, the loan default rate for the (more expensive) transfer loans is on average a full percentage point lower than that for the (cheaper) switching loans. This suggests that firms that establish new relationships after their bank branch closes are “better” than regular switchers in terms of unobservable characteristics. Taken together, these findings provide evidence of losses for firms when banks close branches, even if local markets remain competitive.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.2139/ssrn.2749155
Other Identification Number merlin-id:19921
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