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Type | Journal Article |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | The cognitive foundations of cooperation |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
|
Item Subtype | Original Work |
Refereed | Yes |
Status | Published in final form |
Language |
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Journal Title | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Geographical Reach | international |
ISSN | 0167-2681 |
Volume | 175 |
Page Range | 71 - 85 |
Date | 2020 |
Abstract Text | We conducted an experiment causally manipulating reliance on more intuitive vs. more deliberative behavior through time pressure and time delay. Our design uses a novel manipulation which relies on gradual economic incentives and was devised to avoid the high degree of non-compliance observed in previous experiments. The “social heuristic hypothesis,” which claims that people are intuitively predisposed to cooperate, is not supported in our data. On the aggregate, subjects are not more cooperative under gradually-incentivized time pressure. We also measured individual attitudes on social values and attitudes toward interpersonal risk, and find that both correlate with the tendency to cooperate. A detailed analysis suggests that subjects with a stronger (resp. weaker) prosocial predisposition become more (resp. less) cooperative under time pressure compared to time delay, although the effect is only noticeable for extreme-enough predispositions. A possible interpretation is that relying on more intuitive behavior enhances individual heterogeneous predispositions, while relying on more deliberative behavior moderates them. This suggests that tendencies toward cooperation might not be universal, and rather be moderated by individual characteristics. |
Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.04.019 |
Other Identification Number | merlin-id:19632 |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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Keywords | Economics and econometrics, organizational behavior and human resource management, cooperation, intuition,strategic uncertainty, heterogeneity |
Additional Information | Also published as Working Paper No. 303, Department of Economics, University of Zurich, see https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-157219 |