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| Type | Master's Thesis |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | A Parametric Proof for Strategyproofness in the Large of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Faculty | Faculty of Business, Economics and Informatics |
| Date | 2017 |
| Abstract Text | The probabilistic serial mechanism (PS) (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) is one of the most well-understood mechanisms for the assignment problem. The main result of this thesis is that the degree of strategyproofness for PS converges to 1 as markets get large. This generalizes the large market results of Kojima and Manea (2010) and leads to an elegant, parametric proof that PS is strategyproof in the large (Azevedo and Budish, 2017). A second result in this thesis is the observation that the set of utility functions for which PS makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy is not, in general, equal to the URBI(r) set, which refutes a conjecture of Mennle and Seuken (2017c). |
| Zusammenfassung | Der “Probabilistic Serial Mechanism” (PS) ist einer der bekanntesten und best erforschten Mechanismen für das “Assignment Problem”. Es ist bekannt, dass der PS “Partial Strategyproof” ist und somit in gewissen Fällen manipuliert werden kann. “Partial Strategyproofness” misst die Manipulierbarkeit in dem Parameter “degree of Strategyproofness”. Das Hauptresultat dieser Masterarbeit ist die Tatsache, dass der “degree of Strategyproofness” für den PS gegen 1 konvergiert, wenn die “Assignment Problems” gross werden. Mit diesem Resultat ist es möglich auf elegante Art zu zeigen, dass der PS “Strategyproofness in the Large” erfüllt. Zudem ist es möglich, Abgrenzungen für die Grösse der “Assignment Problems” und den “degree of Strategyproofness” von PS zu geben. |
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