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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Trading cycles for school choice
Organization Unit
  • Marek Pycia
  • M Utku Ünver
  • English
Institution SSRN eLibrary
Series Name SSRN
Number 1899344
ISSN 1556-5068
Number of Pages 13
Date 2011
Abstract Text In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Ünver [2009], and show that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. In particular, we construct the counterpart of Pápai [2000] hiererachical exchange mechanisms for environments with copies.
Official URL
Digital Object Identifier 10.2139/ssrn.1899344
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Keywords Mechanism design, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, matching, house allocation, house exchange, outside options