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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Quantile stable mechanisms
Organization Unit
  • Peter Chen
  • Michael Egesdal
  • Marek Pycia
  • M Bumin Yenmez
  • English
Institution SSRN eLibrary
Series Name SSRN
Number 2526505
ISSN 1556-5068
Number of Pages 22
Date 2015
Abstract Text We construct quantile stable mechanisms, show that they are distinct in sufficiently large markets, and analyze how they can be manipulated by market participants. As a step to showing that quantile stable mechanisms are well defined, we show that median and quantile stable matchings exist when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand. This last result is of independent interest as experiments show that agents who match in a decentralized way tend to coordinate on the median stable matching when it exists.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.2139/ssrn.2526505
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Keywords Matching with contracts, quantile stable mechanisms, preference ranking