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Contribution Details
| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Matching with externalities |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Language |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | SSRN |
| Number | DP13994 |
| ISSN | 1556-5068 |
| Number of Pages | 44 |
| Date | 2019 |
| Abstract Text | We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to allow for externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. Furthermore, we show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we establish novel comparative statics on externalities and show that the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, remain valid despite the presence of externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply. |
| Free access at | Official URL |
| Official URL | https://ssrn.com/abstract=3464522 |
| Related URLs | |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:16482 |
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| Additional Information | Ebenfalls erschienen bei ECON Working Paper als No. 392 (https://www.zora.uzh.ch/204367) sowie bei Review of Economic Studies (https://www.zora.uzh.ch/230229). |