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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Swaps on networks |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Language |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | SSRN |
| Number | 2735524 |
| ISSN | 1556-5068 |
| Number of Pages | 6 |
| Date | 2016 |
| Abstract Text | A group of agents exchange discrete resources on a network without recourse to monetary transfers. Allowing for an arbitrary network structure, we show that there is a unique core outcome in the exchange problem. This unique outcome may be implemented via a natural extension of Gale’s Top Trading Cycle mechanism, which is shown to be the unique mechanism that is individually strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational. |
| Free access at | DOI |
| Official URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2735524 |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.2139/ssrn.2735524 |
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| Keywords | Networks, Top Trading Cycles, individual strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, exchange without transfers |