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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Obvious dominance and random priority
Organization Unit
  • Marek Pycia
  • Peter Troyan
  • English
Institution SSRN eLibrary
Series Name SSRN
Number 2853563
ISSN 1556-5068
Number of Pages 39
Date 2018
Abstract Text We characterize the full class of obviously strategy-proof mechanisms in environments without transfers as clinch-or-pass games that we call millipede games. Some millipede games are simple and widely used in practice, while others may be complex, requiring agents to perform lengthy backward induction, and are rarely observed. We introduce a natural strengthening of obvious strategy-proofness called strong obvious strategy-proofness, which eliminates these complex millipede games. We use our definition to characterize the well-known Random Priority mechanism as the unique mechanism that is efficient, fair, and simple to play, thereby explaining its popularity in practical applications.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.2139/ssrn.2853563
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