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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Large vs. continuum assignment economies: efficiency and envy-freeness
Organization Unit
  • Antonio Miralles
  • Marek Pycia
  • English
Institution Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
Series Name Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series
Number 950
Number of Pages 14
Date 2017
Abstract Text Continuum models are often used to study large finite assignment economies. However, some subtleties must be taken into account. We show that in the large finite random assignment problem without transfers, Competitive Equilibrium with vanishing income differences does not asymptotically characterize the set of efficient and envy-free random assignment profiles. This is in sharp contrast with the continuum model counterpart (Ashlagi and Shi, 2015). The problem is driven by the failure of local non-satiation inherent in no-transfer assignment.
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Keywords Random assignments, efficiency, envy-freeness, convergence failure, competitiv equilibrium from equal incomes
Additional Information Revised version