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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Equilibrium in the symmetric Hirshleifer contest: uniqueness and characterization
Organization Unit
  • Christian Ewerhart
  • Guang-Zhen Sun
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number 286
ISSN 1664-7041
Number of Pages 10
Date 2018
Abstract Text The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.
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Keywords Contests, mixed-strategy equilibrium, rent dissipation, uniqueness, Hirshleifer, Jack (Wirtschaftswissenschafter), Spieltheorie, Gleichgewicht, Kardinalitätsfunktion