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Contribution Details
| Type | Master's Thesis |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | How to pay Proxy Advisory Firms |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Faculty | Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology |
| Number of Pages | 46 |
| Date | 2015 |
| Abstract Text | Proxy advisory [PA] firms have become increasingly important players in the financial market. The theoretical analysis of their conflicts of interest and different payment methods could influence their recommendations and the way they interact with competitors. The proposed model on fee structures concludes that the selection between a fixed fee and a shareholder-value-contingent fee has been proven to incentivize PAs to put more effort and to avoid misreporting. Moreover, the introduction of a social PA could prove to be more of a compliance mechanism, due to price competition and subsidization, rather than a solution to the conflicted nature of PAs. |
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