Contributions in Merlin

Der Beitrag von Thorsten Hens und Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé liefert eine quantitative Analyse der evolutionären Dynamik von Finanzmärkten. Die evolutionäre Finanzmarkttheorie beruht auf einer konsequenten Weiterentwicklung des in letzter Zeit entstandenen verhaltenswissenschaftlich orientierten Ansatzes, der die traditionelle Finanzmarkttheorie ergänzt. Hens und Schenk-Hoppé stellen ein evolutionäres Simulationsmodell vor, bei dem der Aktienmarkt als heterogene Population von häufig interagierenden Portfolio-Strategien im Wettbewerb um Marktkapital verstanden wird. Dabei wenden sie eine an Darwinschen Ideen orientierte Theorie der Portfolio-Selektion auf Aktien des Dow Jones Industrial Average an. Sie analysieren die Vermögensdynamik zwischen unterschiedlichen Portfolio-Strategien in einem Aktienmarktmodell mit tatsächlich gezahlten Dividenden. Die evolutionäre stabile Portfolio-Strategie, deren Budgetanteile proportional zu den erwarteten relativen Dividenden der Aktien sind, erzielt dabei langfristig das höchste Anlagevermögen imWettbewerb mit anderen Strategien. Und sie ist zudem die einzige Strategie mit dieser Eigenschaft.

The persistently low pay-performance sensitivity between executive compensation and firm performance has puzzled both practitioners and academics. We propose a hybrid model that incorporates both moral hazard and adverse selection problems to explain this puzzle. We argue that the managerial labor market is heterogeneous in nature, not homogeneous as assumed by the pure moral hazard model and empirical work based on this model. We demonstrate that the optimal pay-performance sensitivity derived from the hybrid model is lower than that derived from the pure moral hazard model. Furthermore, we also show that pay-performance sensitivity is a function of the mix of types in the market. The more capable managers there are in the market, the more likely the market's average pay-performance sensitivity is high. We then conduct an empirical test and find evidence that is consistent with the prediction of our model.

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In this article we discuss the implementation of general one-factor short rate models with a trinomial tree. Taking the Hull-White model as a starting point, our contribution is threefold. First, we show how trees can be spanned using a set of general branching processes. Secondly, we improve Hull-White's procedure to calibrate the tree to bond prices by a much more efficient approach. This approach is applicable to a wide range of term structure models. Finally, we show how the tree can be adjusted to the volatility structure. The proposed approach leads to an efficient and exible construction method for trinomial trees, which can be easily implemented and calibrated to both prices and volatilities.

In this paper we analyze strategic transfer pricing with risk- and effort-averse divisional managers. In contrast to earlier literature, we find that the existence of a standard agency problem allows transfer pricing to serve as a commitment device even if the transfer prices are not mutually observable. The reason is that transfer prices are set above marginal cost to solve the agency problem and not for strategic purposes. Therefore, delegating the pricing authority to a risk-averse manager implies that he sets a higher product price than does the risk-neutral owner, because at the divisional level the transfer price represents the relevant unit cost for pricing. We show that the optimal scope of managerial authority generally depends on both the risk premium and the intensity of competition in the product market. We also identify conditions under which the delegation of pricing responsibilities to risk-averse managers constitutes a dominant strategy equilibrium.