Contributions in Merlin

This paper develops a model of collective organizational identification for the work-unitlevel. Following Chen and colleagues’ (2004) procedure for validating collective constructs, we first describe the theoretical development process of a collective perception of organizational identification. In a second step, we extend our understanding of the theoretical construct by hypothesizing a nomological net of potential antecedents and outcomes. In a third step, the theoretical model of collective identification is empirically tested. We conducted a longitudinal survey study, gathering data at three different points in time. The data was collected from 26 different country locations of a multinational company. The study sample comprised an average number of 2,355 employees nested within 145 work units. The empirical analysis showed that there exists a reliable and valid construct of collective identification that is different from related constructs (i.e., collective commitment, collective identity). Further, the results of the hypotheses tests confirmed all relationships proposed in the nomological net. Thus, we could show that a charismatic leadership climate fosters the identity strength within a work unit, which in turn leads to an enhanced collective identification. Concerning the outcomes of collective identification, we could empirically demonstrate that the construct has a positive effect on collective organizational commitment, which in turn reduces the collective turnover intention of the employees. The article concludes with theoretical implications, suggestions for practitioners, study limitations and future research directions.

The aim of this article is to provide a new theoretical perspective on the possibilities for clients to manage their consultants. The existing perspectives on managing consultants share the voluntaristic assumption that in principle it is possible to manage the consultant–client relationship. In this article we introduce a new and opposed systemic perspective. From a systems-theoretical point of view, clients and consultants can be conceptualized as two autopoietic communication systems that operate according to idiosyncratic logics. They are structurally coupled through a third system, the so-called “contact system”, which itself constitutes a separate system. Due to the different logics of the three systems there is a barrier to the transfer of meaning between them. Consequently, the possibilities of any kind of direct and intentional intervention by clients in the consultant system appear limited. Hence, a different, more moderate concept of intervention is needed. For that we draw on Helmut Willke’s concept of “contextual guidance”: instead of any direct interventions in the consultant system, the systemic perspective (1) points to the necessity for self-guidance on behalf of the client and (2) directs interventions to the context of the contact system.

We consider the problem of Adverse Selection and optimal derivative design within a Principal–Agent framework. The principal’s income is exposed to non-hedgeable risk factors arising, for instance, from weather or climate phenomena. She evaluates her risk using a coherent and law invariant risk measure and tries minimize her exposure by selling derivative securities on her income to individual agents. The agents have mean–variance preferences with heterogeneous risk aversion coefficients. An agent’s degree of risk aversion is private information and hidden from the principal who only knows the overall distribution. We show that the principal’s risk minimization problem has a solution and illustrate the effects of risk transfer on her income by means of two specific examples. Our model extends earlier work of Barrieu and El Karoui (in Financ Stochast 9, 269–298, 2005) and Carlier et al. (in Math Financ Econ 1, 57–80, 2007).

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