Elisabeth Liechti, Trust and the role of transparency in the context of the investment decision: evidence from institutional investors, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2011. (Dissertation)
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Marc Arnold, Essays on credit risk, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2011. (Dissertation)
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Gabriel Neukomm, Structured finance, acquisitions and debt agency, In: Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, No. 11-55, 2011. (Working Paper)
Modern corporations use complex debt instruments and pursue acquisitions. In orderto analyze the properties of some of these contracts in the event of an acquisition, thispaper considers a company that has an incumbent capital structure, comprising one of five practically important structured debt contracts. An opportunity for an acquisition comes along that was not ex-ante contractible. The equityholder decides on the financing of this expansion by trading off tax advantages of debt against costs of bankruptcy. The modelyields a number of insights for structured debt and acquisitions, four of which are as follows: First, a seniority clause offers the bondholder protection from agency, but it also decreases the equityholder’s incentives to finance the acquisition. Second, embedded call options are valuable even if interest rates are constant, because they allow the equityholder to issue a new bond at fair value. Third, bankruptcy remoteness is valuable, if assets are very risky. Fourth, convertible bonds are vulnerable to agency and the conversion option bears the same incentive problem as a seniority clause. These properties explains, for example, the otherwise puzzling practice of companies buying out convertible bond holders prior to anacquisition. |
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Alexander Wagner, Relational Contracts When the Agent' s Productivity Inside the Relationship is Correlated with Outside Opportunities, In: CEPR Discussion Papers, No. DP8378, 2011. (Working Paper)
An agent can choose to forego bene ts from side opportunities and to instead provide bene ts to the principal. In return, the principal o¤ers rewards. If this exchange is not contractible, typically repeated interaction will be required to sustain it. This model allows the agents productivity in contractible and possibly also non-contractible actions inside the relationship to be correlated with productivity in side activities. This arguably realistic assumption yields several novel implications for the feasibility of relational contracts and for agent selection by principals. The analysis reveals, for example, that optimal agent productivity is often non-monotonic in the importance, to the principal, of ensuring agent reliability. |
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Alexander Wagner, Loyalty and competence in public agencies, Public Choice, Vol. 146 (1/2), 2011. (Journal Article)
Competent public agencies are associated with better economic outcomes. Beyond competence, political leaders need to secure the loyalty of their agencies. Unfortunately, several theories predict a tradeoff between these two valued features. This paper finds that recruitment into agencies is meritocratic where (1) agency officials have poor outside options, (2) careers in agencies are long-lasting, and (3) agency loyalty is important. Moreover, agency competence is lower when (4) loyalty is important but the time horizon is short, and (5) outside opportunities improve but the time horizon is long. This evidence fits best with a theory of loyalty as non-contractible behavior. |
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Alexander Wagner, Board independence and competence, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 20 (1), 2011. (Journal Article)
This paper analyzes board independence and competence as distinct, but inextricably linked aspects of board effectiveness. Competent directors add shareholder value because they have better information about the quality of projects. While a CEO cares about shareholder value, he also wants his board to behave loyally to him by agreeing to projects that give him private benefits. Because many aspects of the CEO-board relationship are not contractible, the paper studies a model of relational contracts, a tool that has hitherto been rarely used in work on corporate governance. The analysis reveals a tradeoff: Inefficient loyalty is endogenously easier to obtain from a less competent board. The implied conflict of interest between shareholders and the CEO is particularly pronounced in difficult times. Fortunately, the tradeoff does not arise with respect to efficient loyalty. Several empirical predictions flow from the model, some of which explain existing empirical facts while others are new. |
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Andreas Walliser, Steuerliche Konsequenzen der Privatisierung von öffentlich-rechtlichen Krankenhäusern, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Michele Giampà, Investor Relations und Transparenz - Eine empirische Analyse, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Philipp Würsch, Transparency & investor relation - an empirical study from Switzerland, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Marius Michel, Folgen und Handlungsempfehlungen aus Sicht des Kreditgebers bei einem Verstoss gegen Financial Covenants in Kreditverträgen, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Karin Neuenschwander, Chancen und Risiken des Soft Commodity Marktes unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Mais und Soja, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Fabienne Ducrey, Evolution of Structured Derivatives During the Recent Financial Crisis, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Bettina Zinnert, A sustainable concept of corporate funding, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Master's Thesis)
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Joßl Ziltener, Prospect Theorie und der Einfluss von Erfahrung, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Patrick Höfliger, The Transaction Volume of Derivatives during scheduled and unscheduled Events, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Barbara Hüber, Beurteilung der Einführung einer Anreizregulierung in der Schweiz, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Master's Thesis)
Seit mehreren Jahren ist in der Economic Regulation ein Paradigmenwechsel von der Kosten-Plus-Regulierung zu Formen der Anreizregulierung zu beobachten. Diese zeichnen sich, primär aufgrund der Anreize zu Effizienzsteigerungen, durch eine konzeptionelle Ãberlegenheit aus. Die Erfahrungen im Ausland zeigen jedoch, dass die Implementierung durch eine beträchtliche Komplexität sowie praktische Herausforderungen charakterisiert sein kann. Insbesondere gelten adäquate Investitionsanreize zur Gewährleistung der langfristigen Versorgungssicherheit und ein stabiler Regulierungsrahmen (bzw. Regulatory Commitment) als kritische Erfolgsfaktoren. Die konkrete Ausgestaltung der Anreizregulierung wird entscheiden, ob bei deren Einführung in der Schweiz das darin enthaltene Potential zur Wohlfahrtssteigerung ausgeschöpft werden kann. |
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Andrin Bögli, Informationsgehalt von Forward-looking Consensus Daten, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Mattia Guidotti, Influence of Corporate Diversification on the Value of Swiss Companies, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Andreas Kohli, Unternehmensbewertung - Ein Vergleich zwischen Realoptionen und Net Present Value, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Patrick Sommerhalder, Herausforderungen bei der Anwendung eines integrierten Kapitalkostenkonzeptes innerhalb von global tätigen Unternehmen, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2010. (Master's Thesis)
Der Kapitalkostensatz nimmt in der finanziellen Führung eines Unternehmens eine wichtige Stellung ein. Vor dem Hintergrund einer optimalen Kapitalallokation und der mehrdimensionalen Verwendung wird der Bestimmung eines risikogerechten Kapitalkostensatzes eine grosse Relevanz beigemessen. In der praktischen Umsetzung und insbesondere im internationalen Kontext führt die Herleitung der Inputparameter aufgrund länderspezifischer Gegebenheiten aber zu verschiedenen Herausforderungen. Neben Inflations- und Währungsrisiko sind die politische und wirtschaftliche Situation eines Landes in die Berechnungen mit einzubeziehen. Obwohl in der Praxis vermehrt eine zukunftsorientierte Sichtweise bei der Berechnung der Kapitalkosten verlangt wird, stützt sich die überwiegende Mehrheit europäischer Unternehmen auf historische Daten ab. |
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