Contributions published at Department of Economics (Florian Scheuer)

In der Sozialversicherung gelten Risikoselektionen als unerwuenscht, weil sie die Gefahr mit sich bringen, dass der einheitliche Risikopool in der Sozialversicherung aufgespalten und die sozialpolitisch gewuenschten Umverteilungsstroeme zwischen den Versicherten reduziert werden. Der Beitrag zeigt am Beispiel der sozialen Krankenversicherung in der Schweiz und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf, dass die Selbstselektion von Versicherten in der Sozialversicherung produktiv, das heisst wohlfahrtssteigernd eingesetzt werden kann, ohne den ‚solidarischen‘ Charakter der Sozialversicherung in Frage zu stellen. Konkret wird vorgeschlagen, den Versicherten innerhalb eines durch einen Risikoausgleich gestuetzten Wettbewerbs zwischen den Krankenkassen eine groessere Wahlfreiheit ueber die Hoehe des Versicherungsschutzes einzuraeumen. Fuer Versicherte mit niedrigem Risiko oder hohem Einkommen kann es sinnvoll sein, ihren Versicherungsschutz innerhalb der Sozialversicherung zu reduzieren, obwohl sie dann aufgrund des konstanten Transfers an andere Versicherte der sozialen Krankenversicherung einen hoeheren Preis pro Einheit Sozialversicherungsschutz zu zahlen haben.

The macro evidence of increased adjustment pressure since the early 1970s suggests that job mobility should have increased. Hence, retrospective and spell data from the German Socio-Economic Panel are combined in order to test the hypothesis that job stability for German workers declined between 1974 and 1994. Using count data regression models in which we control for labour market experience, various demographic factors, and occupation, we find that job stability did not decrease, but if anything increased, between 1974 and 1994. Our finding suggests that labour market inflexibility is an important factor in explaining the European unemployment problem.

In this paper we have examined the scale and cost inefficiency of a sample of Swiss electricity distribution utilities. To do so, we have considered estimation of a stochastic frontier average cost model using the approach suggested by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) for panel data. A translog cost function was estimated using panel data for a sample of 30 municipal utilities over the period 1992-1996. The results indicate the existence of economies of output and customer density and economies of scale. Moreover, the findings on cost inefficiency show that a majority of the distribution utilities is not producing at the minimum level of the cost and that a possible application of the frontier methodology employed in this paper relates to the regulation and benchmarking of the delivery rates.

Attachment of wage as a way for creditors to enforce payment by unwilling or insolvent debtors is not very successful in several countries. Based on a dynamic model of debtor behaviour, this paper explores two alternatives of reform. One is to reduce the rate of attachment, which at present amounts to 100 percent of the wage income exceeding the subsistence level, thus probably destroying incentives to work. According to model simulations, reducing the attachment rate is likely to result in an increase of labour supply but a decrease of attachment revenue per period. Second, the introduction of a debt release would have an ambiguous effect on labour supply. While resulting in a partial loss for creditors, it would permit debtors to get out of debt. A Pareto improvement thus does not seem to be possible. When taking the taxpayers as an involved third party into account, however, a potential Pareto improvement appears attainable.

Die vorliegende Untersuchung wurde ermöglicht durch das vom Bundesamt für Energiewirtschaft finanzierte Projekt „Auswirkungen einer grenzkostenorientierten Tarifrevision auf die Elektrizitätsnachfrage“. Wir danken dem Bundesamt für Energiewirtschaft, dem Bundesamt für Statistik sowie den Elektrizitätswerken der Städte Zürich, Bern und Basel für die tatkräftige Unterstützung des Projekts.

The point of departure for this contribution is a problem common to all Western healthcare systems, namely the deficiency of their basic building block, the physician-patient relationship. This deficiency opens up a market for complementary agents in healthcare, ranging from medical associations to the central government. While Germany has traditionally put the emphasis on medical associations as the dominant complementary agent (DCA), it is shifting towards the central government. Switzerland, on the other hand, traditionally has relied on the cantonal governments and is now moving towards competing (quasi-) private health insurers that would function as DCAs. Thus, managed care, which is a means through which to reshape the physician-patient relationship, is used quite differently in the 2 countries, with differing expected outcomes and different consequences for the pharmaceutical industry.

The purpose of this contribution is to investigate why private insurance of the risk of long-term care (LTC) has known little market success in major industrialized countries, even among the relatively well-to-do. Using a principal-agent framework, it shows that the purchase of LTC insurance by the parent (the principal) is likely to diminish the amount of LTC provided by the major caregivers; namely children earning a comparatively low wage in the labor market. Anticipating this moral hazard effect, the parent is predicted to renounce the purchase of LTC coverage in many cases. This finding throws serious doubts on the welfare effects of recent moves to introduce compulsory social LTC insurance, as, for example, in Germany.

Reviews the book `Health Benefits at Work. An Economic and Political Analysis of Employment-Based Health Insurance,' by Mark V. Pauly.

In this paper, I discuss the interpretation of qualification related income differentials from income functions that control for age rather than the theoretically more appropriate variable years of labour market experience. I reestimate income functions for New Zealand that were originally reported by Maani (1997) with changed specification, and I update her results by also estimating an income function with data from the 1996 census.

This paper is concerned with the problems of posterior simulation and model choice for Poisson panel data models with multiple random effects. Efficient algorithms based on Markov chain Monte Carlo methods for sampling the posterior distribution are developed. A new parameterization of the random effects and fixed effects is proposed and compared with a parameterization in common use, and computation of marginal likelihoods and Bayes factors via Chib’s (1995) method is also considered. The methods are illustrated with two real data applications involving large samples and multiple random effects.

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The winner?take?all nature of all?pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive: rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost. Overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments. Our model predicts this property.

I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder's type. Multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation, efficiency and revenue. The sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders. The sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods. If a particular good, say alpha, is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale, then auction revenue and the price of good alpha are higher when good alpha is sold first.

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We analyse the stability properties of mixed equilibria in 2×2 asymmetric games under evolutionary dynamics. With the standard replicator dynamics these equilibria are stable but not asymptotically stable. We modified the replicator dynamics by introducing players of two types: myopies — like in the standard replicator dynamics — and best responders. The behaviour of the latter is described by a continuos time version of the best reply dynamics. Asymptotic convergence under theModified Replicator Dynamics is proved by identifying a strictly decreasing Ljapunov function. We argue that the finding has important implications to justify the use of economic models with mixed strategy equilibria.