Contributions published at Macroeconomics and Political Economy (Fabrizio Zilibotti)

This paper investigates the determinants of vertical integration. We first derive annumber of predictions regarding the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration from a simple incomplete contracts model. Then, we investigate these predictions using plant-level data for the UK manufacturing sector. Most importantly, and consistent with theory, we find that the technology intensities of downstream (producer) and upstream (supplier) industries have opposite effects on the likelihood of vertical integration. Also consistent with theory, both these effects are stronger when the supplying industry accounts for a large fraction of the producer’s costs. These results are generally robust and hold with alternative measures of technology intensity, with alternative estimation strategies, and with or without controlling for a number ofnfirm and industry-level characteristics.

We study whether the effects on registered manufacturing output of dismantling the License Raj – a system of central controls regulating entry and productionnactivity in this sector – vary across Indian states with different labor market regulations. The effects are found to be unequal across Indian states with differentnlabor market regulations. In particular, following delicensing, industries locatednin states with proemployer labor market institutions grew more quickly than thosenin proworker environments.

For many kinds of capital, depreciation rates change systematically with the age of the capital. Consider an example that captures essential aspects of human capital, both regarding its accumulation and its depreciation: a worker obtains knowledge in period 0, then uses this knowledge innproduction in periods 1 and 2, and thereafter retires. Here, depreciation accelerates: it occurs at a 100% rate after period 2, and at a lowe (perhaps zero) rate before that. The present paper analyzesnthe implications of non-constant depreciation rates for the optimal timing of taxes on capital income. The main finding is that under natural assumptions, the path of tax rates over time must be oscillatory. Oscillatory tax rates are optimal when depreciation rates accelerate with the age of the capital (as in the above example), and provided that the government can commit to the path ofnfuture tax rates but cannot apply different tax rates in a given year to different vintages of capital.

In the heart of the Great Crisis, amidst great uncertainty and concerns surrounding the future of capitalism, John Maynard Keynes launched his optimistic prophecy that growth and technological change would allow mankind to solve its economic problem within ancentury. He envisioned a world where people would work much less and be less oppressednby the satisfaction of material needs. To what extent have his predictions turned out to benaccurate? This essays attempts to provide some answers.

This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of debt, government finance and expenditure. Agents have preferences over a private and a government-provided publicngood, financed through labor taxation. Subsequent generations of voters choose taxation, government expenditure and debt accumulation through repeated elections. Debt introducesna conflict of interest between young and old voters: the young want more fiscal discipline.nWe characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the dynamic voting game. If taxes do not distort labor supply, the economy progressively depletes its resources throughndebt accumulation, leaving future generations “enslaved”. However, if tax distortions arensufficiently large, the economy converges to a stationary debt level which is bounded awaynfrom the endogenous debt limit. The current fiscal policy is disciplined by the concern ofnyoung voters for the ability of future government to provide public goods. The steady-statenand dynamics of debt depend on the voters’ taste for public consumption. The stronger the preference for public consumption, the less debt is accumulates. We extend the analysis to redistributive policies and political shocks. The theory predicts government debt to be mean reverting and debt growth to be larger under right-wing than under left-wingngovernments. Data from the US and from a panel of 21 OECD countries confirm thesentheoretical predictions.

The British Industrial Revolution triggered a reversal in the social order of society whereby the landed elite was replaced by industrial capitalists rising from thenmiddle classes as the economically dominant group. Many observers have linkednthis transformation to the contrast in values between a hard-working and frugal middle class and an upper class imbued with disdain for work. We propose an economic theory of preference formation where both the divergence of attitudesnacross social classes and the ensuing reversal of economic fortunes are equilibriumnoutcomes. In our theory, parents shape their children's preferences in response toneconomic incentives. If financial markets are imperfect, this results in the stratification of society along occupational lines. Middle-class families in occupationsnthat require effort, skill, and experience develop patience and work ethic, whereas upper-class families relying on rental income cultivate a refined taste for leisure. These class-specific attitudes, which are rooted in the nature of pre-industrial professions, become key determinants of success once industrialization transforms the economic landscape.

This paper analyzes an overlapping generation model of redistribution and public good provision under repeated voting. Expenditures are financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across skill groups and across generations. We focus on politico-economic Markov equilibria and contrast these with the Ramsey allocation under commitment. The model features indeterminate equilibria, with a key role of forward-looking strategic voting. Due to the lack of commitment to future policies, the tax burden may be on the wrong side of the dynamic Laffer curve. Moreover, restrictions on government policies can in some cases be welfare improving.

null

This paper analyzes the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. Decentralized control, on the other hand, delegates authority to a manager with superior information. However, the manager can use her informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the principal. As the available public information about the specific technology increases, the trade-off shifts in favor of centralization. We show that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization. Using three datasets of French and British firms in the 1990s, we report robust correlations consistent with these predictions.

Trends in arts and culture tend to be longer-lasting and less fragile than in other fields such as clothing design. Most herding models are not able to explain such stability, instead predicting informational cascades to be fragile and fads to be frequent. Thenpresent contribution is able to explain the hysterisis of trends in arts by incorporating thenaccumulation of consumption capital into a herding model. Further, the model is testednempirically by analyzing measures of relative and absolute concentration in the television business. It is concluded that by being exposed to art and culture people accumulate consumption capital for a particular style or artist and that this mechanism tends to make herding in arts stable over time.

null

null

We analyze an economy where firms undertake both innovation and adoption of technologies from the world technology frontier. The selection of high-skill managers and firms is more important for innovation than for adoption. As the economy approaches the frontier, selection becomes more important. Countries at early stages of development pursue an investment-based strategy, which relies on existing firms and managers to maximize investment but sacrifices selection. Closer to the world technology frontier, economies switch to an innovation-based strategy with short-term relationships, younger firms, less investment, and better selection of firms and managers. We show that relatively backward economies may switch out of the investment-based strategy too soon, so certain policies such as limits on product market competition or investment subsidies, which encourage the investment-based strategy, may be beneficial. However, these policies may have significant long-run costs because they make it more likely that a society will be trapped in the investment-based strategy and fail to converge to the world technology frontier.

We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. Workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban, unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income. Fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences, and multiple steady states can arise. The introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill-biased technological change, which induces parents to choose smaller families. The theory can account for the observation that, in Britain, regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided with rapid fertility decline.

Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy for discouraging terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for the government to show a firm commitment to swift reconstruction. Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate how a credible claim to rebuild any cultural monuments destroyed discourages terrorist attacks by altering the terrorists’ expectations and by increasing the government’s reputation costs if they fail to rebuild.

We model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without commitment among individuals of different types and income realizations. We find that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment. The difference is larger, the lower is the political influence of young agents, the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations, and the lower is risk-aversion. Furthermore, there tends to be too much redistribution in the political equilibrium. Finally, smooth preference aggregation, as under probabilistic voting, produces less persistence and does not admit multiple equilibria, which occur under majority-voting aggregation.

This article presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model explaining cross-country data on geographical mobility, unemployment, and labor market institutions. Rational forward-looking agents vote on unemployment insurance (UI). Agents with higher moving costs (larger attachment to their location) prefer more generous UI. Attachment is assumed to increase with the duration of residence. UI mitigates incentives for moving and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. This self-reinforcing mechanism can yield two steady-states: one "European" and one "American." The former (latter) features high (low) unemployment, low (high) geographical mobility, and high (low) UI.

This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting, where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution. A key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution, since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters. The model features multiple equilibria. In some equilibria, positive redistribution persists forever. In other equilibria, even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period. Skill-biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely.

We construct a model where the equilibrium organization of firms changes as an economy approaches the world technology frontier. In vertically integrated firms, owners (managers) have to spend time both on production and innovation activities, and this creates managerial overload, and discourages innovation. Outsourcing of some production activities mitigates the managerial overload, but creates a holdup problem, causing some of the rents of the owners to be dissipated to the supplier. Far from the technology frontier, imitation activities are more important, and vertical integration is preferred. Closer to the frontier, the value of innovation increases, encouraging outsourcing.

We analyze positive theories of redistribution, social insurance and public good provision in a dynamic macroeconomic framework. Political outcomes are determined via repeated voting and driven by a conflict of interests between agents. Voters and politicians rationally forecast the impact of current political choices on future political and economic outcomes. The theory is consistent with large differences in the size of governments across societies. These need not rely on intrinsic differences in preferences or technology, but may be driven by self-fulfilling expectations about the robustness of the welfare state.